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Hidden Hunger in Peacetime and Wartime:
Retailoring the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to FoodPower Discourses in Burundi and North Korea,
Between International Politics and International Law
Riccardo Vecellio Segate †
ABSTRACT: The framework known as ‘Responsibility to Protect’
(“R2P”) has afforded legal endorsement and codification to the
doctrine that States hold responsibility under public international
law for the protection of their own citizens and of those who
reside within their prescriptive jurisdiction. This holds true in
peacetime and wartime alike, and it is shaped by an understanding
of ‘security’ which increasingly calls for comprehensive and
multifaceted assessments (human security) to replace the
traditional ones centred on military protection. Within the humansecurity paradigm, the right to food stands at the forefront of a
reconceptualization which proceeds beyond the quantity of
available (or accessible) food, up to scrutinise its nutritional value
more pertinently, and human capabilities in context. ‘Hidden
hunger’—the chronic insufficiency of nutrients intake that
victimises hundreds of millions of children worldwide—is
currently dismayingly unaddressed in legal scholarship, despite
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representing a proven trigger of violent spirals which turn
countries to conflict and frustrate their Gross Domestic Product
(“GDP”). It is therefore essential to analyse the chances to
successfully invoke the R2P framework as to intervene in
countries whose ruling classes can be identified as the major cause
of protracted hidden hunger (either because those regimes keep
their population in a condition of civil conflict, or due to those
rulers’ individual greed and unconstrained authoritarianism). The
case studies of Burundi and North Korea respectively are
enlightening to this end, and surprisingly illustrate that whereas,
strictly legally, the R2P provides (modest) enhanced room for
perpetrators accountability, its political impact restricts the
options available for the international community to argue that the
wilful production (or passive acceptance) of hidden hunger
violates the internationally recognised ‘right to food’, and
intervene accordingly whenever necessary.

I.
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IV.
V.
VI.
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I. Introduction
Once inside, there is an unnerving quiet to the children’s ward.
The healthier babies cry, but many just stare blankly. It’s not
immediately clear if their eyes look too big or their faces too
small. Malnourishment can have very few tell-tale signs to an
untrained eye — perhaps just a paleness, a smallness. As the scale
continues, some children have lost hair or had their hair turn
orange, some have swollen bellies, or no belly to speak of, or
bones sticking out through wilted skin. Some of them have aged
faces, with skin that wrinkles when they cry. 1

1 Jane Ferguson, How We Got the Images You Weren’t Meant to See in Yemen, PBS
NEWSHOUR, (July 3, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/reporting-in-yementhe-city-that-has-fallen-off-a-cliff [https://perma.cc/CF4A-HKFH] (discussing the
Author’s experience reporting from Yemen, which won her several international prizes for
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The purpose of this study is to provide an innovative analytical
framework to compare the cases of Burundi and North Korea in
relation to potential claims of non-compliance with their
responsibility to protect (“R2P”) their populations. This comparison
will be performed by engaging with ongoing discourses on the right
to food (“RTF”), scrutinised primarily—although not exclusively—
from an international human rights law (“IHRL”) perspective, and
in its unavoidable interfaces with international humanitarian law
(“IHL”), 2 international criminal law (“ICL”), 3 and general public
international law (“PIL”). More accurately, this article wonders
whether the international community is entitled to invoke a ‘breach’
of the R2P owing to States’ non-compliance with their duty to
address their populations’ RTF, with particular reference to longlasting ‘hidden hunger’ (a sub-typology of perpetually harmful state
of chronic malnutrition 4 ). Indeed, whilst the controversial R2P
concept applies to man-made (or man-worsened) situations of
manifest, acute hunger—and even in these situations, international
politics may hinder its effectiveness—its applicability to pervasive,
underground malnutrition due to a State’s grave hindrance or
omissions is far less straightforward a conjecture.
To answer this interrogative, several steps will need to be
accomplished. Part II will inspect the RTF, especially in its
qualitative component linked to the fighting against the so-called
hidden hunger, 5 and report insightful exemplifications from Israel
investigative war journalism) (emphasis added).
2 See ILIAS BANTEKAS & LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND
PRACTICE 658–59 (2d ed. 2013).
3 “[V]iolations of the right to housing, food, education, work, health or other ESCR
[ . . . ] can give raise to a [S]tate’s violation of ESCR as well as individual criminal
responsibility for war crimes.” Evelyne Schmid, War Crimes Related to Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 71 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 523, 540 (2011).
4 HANS KONRAD BIESALSKI, HIDDEN HUNGER 2 (2013). Overweight and
underweight can both be symptomatic of this malaise, which is not necessarily as much
prima facie evident as extreme starvation is, yet it is in potential equally disruptive for
affected individuals’ life and the ‘proficient,’ resilient running of their societies. See also
AMY R. BEAUDREAULT, NUTRITION POLICY PRIMER: THE UNTAPPED PATH TO GLOBAL
HEALTH, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND HUMAN SECURITY 1, 3 (CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD.
2019),
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
NutritionPrimer_layout_WEB_v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/W35R-G6JK]. For exhaustive
data on hidden hunger, see Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Micronutrient Deficiency, OUR
WORLD IN DATA (Aug. 2017), https://ourworldindata.org/micronutrient-deficiency
[https://perma.cc/5C5N-E5S9].
5 The reader is advised that certain academic publications on food insecurity are
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and Palestine. Part III will assess the soft law of R2P, with particular
care to the different normative stances expressed by key global
players. Part IV will expound the case-studies of Burundi and North
Korea, enucleating the different approaches to the aforementioned
rights and concepts in peacetime (North Korea) and wartime
(Burundi). 6 Part V will draw a comparison between Burundi and
North Korea, supported by the theoretical grounds made explicit in
the first sections. Part VI will conclude, perhaps surprisingly, that
not only is the R2P of negligible help in addressing RTF violations
in wartime, but paradoxically, by spelling out more precise grounds
for intervention, it politically (although not legally) resulted in a de
facto restricting regime. On the contrary, R2P in peacetime can
provide some useful legal bases to secure populations’ right to enjoy
sufficient nutrition (not exclusively in quantitative terms). It has
been hypothesised that “[h]umanitarianism may have become an
outlet for those looking for a place to express their politics in a place
of purity, but it offers no such refuge[.]” 7 This article seeks to
demonstrate that with regards to human-induced or humanworsened (hidden) hunger, this prophecy has already fulfilled itself.
This analysis will rely primarily on process-narratives
extrapolated from the selected case-studies, and secondarily rest on
statistics, estimations, projections, and other empirical data
retrieved from works by other Authors. This is to best cater 8 for the
unaware of the aforementioned technical, scientific meaning of ‘hidden hunger,’ so that
they rather intend to examine generalised conditions of nutritional insecurity that escape
metrics, surveys, and figures as reported in publicly released statistics. See, e.g., Madeleine
‘Maddy’ Power et al., Hidden Hunger? Experiences of Food Insecurity Amongst Pakistani
and White British Women, 120 BRIT. FOOD J., 2716, 2716-32 (2018).
6 Burundi and North Korea have been chosen not only for exemplifying wartime
and peacetime conditions, but also for standing as the most food-insecure countries in
Africa and Asia respectively, once one has omitted to consider ‘failed States’ such as
Somalia. SARAD TANDON ET AL., , PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
41 (U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/
84526/eib-175.pdf?v=7156 [https://perma.cc/6BSV-ASX8] (pursuing the same logic
adopted by previous studies, and illustrating “different degrees of abuse of the right to food
and different political and economic mechanisms that resulted in its abuse.”). RHODA E.
HOWARD-HASSMANN, STATE FOOD CRIMES 4 (2016).
7 MICHAEL N. BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM
237 (2011).
8 Deborah R. Hensler & Matthew Alexander Gasperetti, The Role of Empirical
Legal Studies in Legal Scholarship, Legal Education and Policy Making: A US
Perspective, in RETHINKING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE 450, 452
(Rob Van Gestel, Hans W. Micklitz & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017).
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exigency to uncover what lies behind phenomena which have been
described at length in social-science scholarship, but whose legal
meaning and implications are yet to be assessed.
II. Hidden Hunger: Towards a Qualitative ‘Right to Food’ for
a Dignifying Life
In public health, there is increasing evidence that social
inequality, not just absolute deprivation, is bad for our health. . . .
Historically, human rights law has highlighted that poverty is not
only about lack of money; it is also about discrimination and
disempowerment. . . . Further, in a human rights framework, the
ways in which certain people are low on the ladder represent not
just a tragedy inherent vulnerability but active processes of
exclusion and marginalization, for which there should
accountability and redress. 9

The RTF, 10 which must “not be interpreted in a narrow or
restrictive sense which equates it with a minimum package of
calories,” 11 is ordinarily understood as a negative right rather than
a positive one. Indeed, the obligation that States owe their citizens
is not necessarily to provide them with food directly for free
(regardless of the circumstances), 12 but to avoid any undue
interference with their access to sufficient amount of food 13 for
their survival and, in the understanding of some Authors, their
overall wellbeing. This bounds the work of international
organizations as well, 14 not to mention the functioning of private

9 Alicia Ely Yamin, Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in
Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 (2009)
(emphasis added).
10 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25 (Dec.
10, 1948).
11 Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, ¶ 6 (May 12, 1999).
12 BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 349.
13 Especially in armed conflicts, “such scenarios can often be understood as
violations of ESCR, particularly where [S]tates fail to respect rights, such as by directly
interfering with the enjoyment of people’s access to housing, food, education or health, or
where states fail to protect persons within their jurisdiction from abuses by non-state
actors.” See Schmid, supra note 3, at 524, 527 (emphasis added).
14 Fons Coomans, Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Framework of International Organisations, in 11 MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 360, 371–72 (Armin von Bogdandy, Rüdiger
Wolfrum & Christiane E. Philipp eds., 2007).

186

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

companies within numerous domestic jurisdictions 15 as much as
transnationally. 16 And yet, either by providing it directly or not
hampering the access to it, a State’s duty to guarantee food
availability is part of any security-based modern ‘social contract’
between governors and governed. 17 Any Hobbesian-Rousseauian
pact bestows a duty of policy coherence upon the governors,
especially when resources are scarce or ill-distributed: that “a
[S]tate … simultaneously commit[s] to a national hunger reduction
strategy while participating in trading arrangements that leave their
citizens virtually without recourse to corporations that commit
rights abuses” is not acceptable. 18 Managing food security
presupposes a careful balance between domestic consumption and
stockpiling and international import/export of foodstuffs, which is
why even the policies pursued by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) strive to ensure that States never choose to disregard food
security for the only sake of trading more openly or efficiently. 19
The same holds true with regards to land-intensive foreign
investments, that are to be sought only insofar as they do not prevent
local citizens from feeding themselves by managing their own
properties and—collectively—their State’s natural resources. 20

15 See Surabhi Chopra, The Rights to Food and Water: Dependencies and Dilemmas,
INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & BUS. 27 (2010), https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Right_to_Food_and_Wa
ter_Dependencies_and_Dilemmas.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3FV-4X2L].
16 See Jessica Fanzo et al., Tying the Knot: An Interdisciplinary Approach to
Understanding the Human Right to Adequate Nutrition, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 62,
104–07 (2018).
17 Redie Bereketeab, State Legitimacy and Government Performance in the Horn of
Africa, 79 AFR. STUD. 51, 58 (2020).
18 Nandini Ramanujam, Nicholas Caivano & Semahagn Gashu Abebe, From
Justiciability to Justice: Realizing the Human Right to Food, 11 MCGILL INT’L J.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2015).
19 See generally Michael Fakhri, A History of Food Security and Agriculture in
International Trade Law, 1945–2017, in NEW VOICES AND NEW PERSPECTIVES IN
INTERNATINAL ECONOMICS LAW, 55 (John D. Haskell & Akbar Rasulov eds., 2019);
Kerstin Mechlem, Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture and Human Rights: Options for the
Integration of the Right to Food into the Agreement on Agriculture, in 10 MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 127 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.,
2006).
20 See Christian Häberli & Fiona Smith, Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct
Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid ‘Land Grab’, 77 MOD.
L. REV. 189, 200 (2014); see also Carmen G. Gonzalez, World Poverty and Food
Insecurity, 3 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 56, 80–2 (2015).
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Relatively recently, 21 the focus also shifted from quantity to
quality: 22 not only does a population enjoy the right to access a
sufficient ‘level’ of nutrition, but nourishment must also cover their
basic physical needs. 23 For instance, it must compute the access to
essential micronutrients, the lack thereof leading to the so-defined
‘hidden hunger,’ 24 severe diseases and, ultimately, to death. 25
Children are particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon, 26 which is
detrimental to their physical and mental development and
significantly shortens their life expectancy. 27 “What the United
21 Unfortunately, until one decade ago, it was still possible to denote the perpetuation
of exceedingly parochial narratives such as that food quality in the developing world is not
a concern because people there are hungry [sic], thus only quantity matters instead. See,
e.g., HANS MORTEN HAUGEN, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: WITH A
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ MEASURES FOR FOOD PRODUCTION
AND DISTRIBUTION 120-26 (2007). “This emphasis on hunger also implies that the focus
in this study will be on accessibility of food, which is the prevailing concern in developing
countries. Issues relating to food quality or acceptability, which is a stronger concern in
many industrialized countries, will not receive much attention. [ . . . T]here is no doubt
that, concerning food, the term ‘adequate’ must refer to a minimum daily food intake.
Hunger exists as a consequence of food deprivation, or not having enough to eat.” Id. at
120.
22 See Cecilia Rocha, Food Insecurity as Market Failure: A Contribution from
Economics, 4 J. HUNGER & ENV’T NUTRITION 5, 7-8 (2007).
23 “The degree to which concern with micronutrient deficiencies became established
within the development discourse could be seen, for instance, in the 2008 Copenhagen
Consensus conference of leading international economists and specialists, who chose
micronutrient remediation as one of the most cost-effective development interventions.”
AYA HIRATA KIMURA, HIDDEN HUNGER: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF SMARTER FOODS 2
(2013).
24 “A chronic lack of micronutrients – vitamins and minerals – whose effects may
not be immediately apparent and whose consequences may be long-term and profound.”
Hans Konrad Biesalski, Hidden Hunger in the Developed World, in THE ROAD TO GOOD
NUTRITION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 39, 40 (Manfred Eggersdorfer et al. eds., 2013); see
also Destaw A. Yigzaw, Hunger and the Law: Freedom from Hunger as a Freestanding
Right, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 655, 660–61 (2014).
25 According to the United Nations, hidden hunger “increases vulnerability to
infection, birth defects and impaired development and can lead to premature death.” Hilal
Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food and Nutrition, U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016).
26 See generally Judith Hodge, Hidden Hunger: Approaches to Tackling
Micronutrient Deficiencies, in NOURISHING MILLIONS: STORIES OF CHANGE IN NUTRITION
35 (Stuart Gillespie et al. eds., 2016); Victor M. Aguayo, One in Three Children Do Not
Get the Nutrition They Need, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/one-in-three-children-dont-get-the-nutritionthey-need/ [https://perma.cc/ED89-V6U4].
27 “For instance, iron deficiency anaemia impacts negatively on cognitive

188

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) calls ‘hidden hunger’ is
undernourishment and/or malnutrition between birth and the age of
five, and it has disastrous effects: a child . . . will never recover . . .
and will be disabled for life”. 28 Unsurprisingly, the relevant
Convention specifies that the food provided must be “nutritious,” 29
echoed by the later Principles for Responsible Investment in
Agriculture and Food Systems. 30 Scholars have plentifully
demonstrated that as a consequence of the deregulated
financialization of the real economy, 31 the resultant sharp price
inflation of food commodities between 2006 and 2008, and
governments’ inability to handle the crisis by ensuring essential
levels and diversity of affordable food, 32 children in Central
development and academic performance in school-age children . . . [v]itamin A
deficiency is a leading cause of blindness and corneal damage. In developing countries,
163 million children were estimated to be vitamin A-deficient.” U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. &
SOC. AFF., WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY 2013: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
CHALLENGES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/344, at 89-91, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.C.1 (2013),
available at
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/
wess2013/WESS2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4FB-MET4].
Another example—an
exceedingly severe one—comes from the noma disease. See ‘The Tragedy of Noma’,
prepared by Mr. Jean Ziegler, member of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee,
A/HRC/AC/3/CRP.3, 31 July 2009, ¶¶ 5, 9, 12, 41; Human Rights Council, Preliminary
Study on Severe Malnutrition and Childhood Diseases with Children Affected by Noma
as an Example, A/HRC/AC/7/CRP.2, ¶ 37 (Aug. 2, 2011); Human Rights Council, Study
of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on severe malnutrition and childhood
diseases with children affected by noma as an example, A/HRC/AC/8/7, ¶¶ 8-9 (Jan. 23,
2012).
28 Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Preliminary Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right to Food, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. A/56/210 (July 23, 2001).
29 G.A. Res. 44/25, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24.2(c)
(Sept. 2, 1990).
30 Principles 1(i), 1(iv) and 8(vi); all of these ten Principles, which are obviously soft
law, were endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security on October 15, 2014.
COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE
(2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-au866e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9QMN6XG].
31 See generally Anna E. Chadwick, Gambling on Hunger? The Right to Adequate
Food and Commodity Derivatives Trading, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233 (2018).
32 “There are three basic approaches to coping with the impact of high food prices
once they hit world markets: domestic price stabilisation, increasing supplies available in
local markets, and providing safety nets to poor consumers. All three are directed at and
must be managed by individual countries themselves.” Charles Peter Timmer, Food
Security in Asia and the Pacific: The Rapidly Changing Role of Rice, 1 ASIA & PAC. POL’Y
STUD. 73, 85-86 (2014).
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African Republic, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone have suffered
long-term physical harm provoked by scarce dietary diversity and
restricted intake of essential nutrients. 33 This is not surprising:
“sharp increases in food prices can have as great an impact on
hunger and mortality as crop failures . . . [A S]tate that lets this
happen has failed to live up to its obligation to protect [its most
vulnerable citizens’] right to food from the actions of other
enterprises and individuals.” 34
Notably, the irresponsible, unaccountable, 35 and inhumane (as
well as unlawful) 36 Israeli segregation of Palestinians and
expropriation or confiscation of their private property in the Gaza

33 Anna E. Chadwick, Commodity Derivatives, Contract Law, and Food Security, 9
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 371, 372 (2018). Instead, it is not fully demonstrated that
increased prices have resulted in riots and eventually led to the Arab Spring; regrettably,
academic literature is often miscited to that effect by other scholars who cite previous
works superficially. See Lander & Vetharaniam reporting that “the violence that stemmed
from the Arab Spring also took place in the context of rapid surges in the cost of basic
commodities, including food,” despite the fact that its supporting source
(Van Weezel) endeavoured to question exactly the pertinence of such link, as “to add some
nuances to the current consensus in the literature, that higher food prices are
strongly associated with civil unrest.” Brian Lander & Rebecca Vetharaniam
Richards, Addressing Hunger and Starvation in Situations of Armed Conflict - Laying the
Foundations for Peace, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 675, 686-87; see also Stijn
van Weezel, Food Imports, International Prices, and Violence in Africa, 68 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 758, 760 (2016). For a sample of literature linking this inflation to the riots,
see contra Matias E. Margulis, The World Trade Organization Between Law and Politics:
Negotiating a Solution for Public Stockholding for Food Security
Purposes, 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 343, 351 n.33 (2018).
34 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE RIGHT TO FOOD GUIDELINES: INFORMATION PAPERS AND
CASE STUDIES, 11 (2006), http://www.fao.org/3/a-a0511e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK9BB8J8].
35 But this will hopefully turn for the better soon. See Jeff D. Handmaker & Alaa
Tartir, ICC and Palestine Symposium: The (Non) Effects of Oslo on Rights and Status,
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 6, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/06/icc-and-palestinesymposium-the-non-effects-of-oslo-on-rights-and-status/
[https://perma.cc/G2MTZPLN].
36 See Gilles Giacca & Ellen Nohle, Positive Obligations of the Occupying Power:
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 491, 515 (2019); see also Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, The Legal and
Policy Implications of the Possibility of Palestinian Statehood, U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 343, 379, 399, 433 (2012). Contra Barak Medina, The Role of the Legislature in
Determining Legitimate Responses to Security Threats: The Case of Israel, in ISRAELI
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 445, 447 (Aharon Barak et al. eds, 2013).
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Strip, 37 where IHRL continues to apply 38 and the complexity on
the ground recursively revives discussions on a brand-new ius post
bellum to be codified, 39 has deprived entire generations of children
of a balanced diet, 40 leading to hidden hunger 41 and related
physical and mental deficiencies. 42 “The idea is to put the
Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger,” the
businessman and legal advisor to Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Dov
Weissglas, shamelessly remarked; 43 this will cut fertility rates and
37 Shelly Aviv Yeini, The Law Enforcement Paradigm Under the Laws of Armed
Conflict: Conceptualizing Yesh Din v. IDF Chief of Staff, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 461,
464-65; see also HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 149.
38 See KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (2011).
39 Roxana Vatanparast, Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems
of a Jus Post Bellum Legal Framework, in JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE
FOUNDATIONS 142, 148 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014).
40 See Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Report Submitted by
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 (Jan. 10,
2003).
41 “Around 80% of Gazans are dependent on humanitarian aid, mainly food items.
Since the blockade, abject poverty has tripled, necessitating a shift in diet from proteinrich to low-cost, high-carbohydrate foods. This shift in diet has triggered concern about
the incidence of vitamin and mineral deficiencies.” SEADA HUSSEIN ADEM, PALESTINE
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 30 n.144 (2019).
42 In the Occupied Territories, “the Palestinians are suffering in the main from
micronutrient deficiencies – what the World Health Organisation calls the ‘hidden hunger.’
It may be less dramatic than the protein-energy malnutrition . . . but, on the scale that it
is found among the Palestinians, it is just as serious. Micronutrient deficient children fail
to grow and develop normally; their cognition is damaged, often severely and irreversibly;
and their immune systems are compromised. In both adults and children, mental and
physical capacities are impaired. In extreme cases blindness and death result.” Peter
(Mar.
4,
2003),
Hansen,
Hungry
in
Gaza,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/05/israel.guardiananalysispage
[https://perma.cc/M5VD-PUZP]. Scholarly publications have confirmed that a “long
history of dispossession and episodes of lower and higher intensity violence” (including
unlawful food-deprivation due to spatial surveillance and psychological subjugation, as
illustrated in the present analysis) has indeed jeopardized children’s mental health in
Palestine; and yet, “[r]ather than considering social suffering an illness that needs to be
‘cured’ it is the issue of collective and cumulative exposure to Israeli aggression and the
international communities condoning of it, that needs to be addressed”. Yoke Rabaia,
Mahasin F. Saleh & Rita Giacaman, Sick or Sad? Supporting Palestinian Children Living
in Conditions of Chronic Political Violence, 28 CHILD. & SOC’Y 172, 174, 178 (2014).
43 EVE SPANGLER, UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL/PALESTINE: RACE, NATION, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CONFLICT 187 (2015). Similar threshold-centred narratives have been
shaping the Israeli handling of Palestinians’ water-consumption needs. See, e.g., Mia
Tamarin, The Human(ised) Right to Water and Its Limits: The Case of Israel-Palestine, 6
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the redundancy of “masses of economically superfluous young
men,” then-Harvard ‘scholar’ Martin Seth Kramer proudly added. 44
Whatever the reasons, the geopolitical interests at play, and
corollary excuses, there can be no doubts about Israel’s
responsibilities:
[I]n 1996, 10.6 percent of children under five were stunted, or too
short for their age: in 2002 this figure had increased to 16.1
percent, but it decreased to 11.8 percent in 2007. The 2002 figure
is two years after the beginning of the second intifada, when Israel
was particularly exigent in controlling borders. Similarly, the
percentage of children under five who were wasted, or
underweight, increased from 3.6 in 1996 to 9.4 in 2002, but
declined to 1.8 in 2007. A 2007 study of the village of Beit Haroun
in Gaza found that more than half the population went without
fruit, vegetables, fish, and meat on most days. 45

And again, “the publicly released maps for the Gaza Strip …
show that 178 km2 of the 358 km2 within the borders is under
cultivation. Using multi-spectral satellite imagery, one can see that
it is actually less than 100 km2. Much of this was subsequently
compromised during the 2018–19 Great Return March
demonstrations,” 46 where 189 Palestinian faltalties were certified
by an independent UN investigation and condemned as excessive
and unjustified use of lethal force, while no fatalty was registered
on the conflict-escalating Israeli side. 47
Gaza has been living for decades under a Kafkian,

INT’L J. WATER GOV. 135, 141-2 (2018).
44 M.J. Rosenberg, Is Harvard Prof Advocating Palestinian Genocide?, HUFFPOST
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/harvard-prof-urges-popula_b_472191
[https://perma.cc/9V8G-CRM5]. Tellingly, Dr. Kramer is an influential and politically
active Israeli citizen. Stephen Martin Walt, Kramer Versus Kramer, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb.
28, 2010), https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/28/kramer-versus-kramer/ [https://perma.cc/
8S79-FN8V]; MAX BLUMENTHAL, GOLIATH: LIFE AND LOATHING IN GREATER ISRAEL 91
(2013); see also Patrick Williams, Postcolonialism and Orientalism, in POSTCOLONIALISM
AND ISLAM: THEORY, LITERATURE, CULTURE, SOCIETY AND FILM 48, 52 (Geoffrey Nash et
al. eds., 2013) (providing academic commentary on Dr. Kramer’s controversial statement).
45 HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 118.
46 Alexander H. Hay et al., Reconstructing Infrastructure for Resilient Essential
Services During and Following Protracted Conflict: A Conceptual Framework, 101 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 1001, 1017 (2019).
47 See Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission
of Inquiry on the Protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, A/HRC/40/74, ¶¶ 90, 93
(Feb. 25, 2019).
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dispossessive, permanent state of exception where not only
“individual military officials [sic] can determine what foods will be
available to families . . . and make judgments about the quality of
care that a child might expect from a relative in Gaza versus a parent
in the West Bank,” 48 but such a judgement is a quantitative-only
assessment based on abstract governmental calculations over
supposedly survival-ensuring caloric needs. 49 This is glaringly
incorrect:
nutrient requirements are individually determined and depend on,
among other things, the sex and age of each individual. It is
therefore difficult to generalize consumption and nutrition data
across populations and the data cannot simply be aggregated at
household or national levels as has been done with dietary energy
intake in the past [ . . . ]. Such simplification ignores dietary
quality. In the past, energy intake was simply used against
referenced standards and thresholds established against standard
deviations above or below the norm. Moreover, energy intake is
only one requirement for sound nutrition. [ . . . ] Our expanded
knowledge of the link between short-term shocks and long-term
development has aroused widespread interest in how people build
resilience to adversity. 50

Critically, “[w]hile calorie adequacy may ensure protein adequacy
(though not protein quality), it most often fails to quench the hidden
hunger”. 51
Israeli legislators routinely frame any domestic and

48 Sari Bashi, Controlling Perimeters, Controlling Lives: Israel and Gaza, 7 LAW &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 243, 263 (2013).
49 Id. at 259 n. 42. Calculating dietary needs in such a robotised manner comes as
an alienating distortion of the bureaucratic ‘culture of auditing’ that increasingly features
in human-rights governmentality. On this culture of ‘micromanagement’ and its too often
concealed mishandling. See, e.g., David McGrogan, The Population and the Individual:
The Human Rights Audit as the Governmentalization of Global Human Rights
Governance, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1073, 1097 (2018) (“One of the dangers posed by
human rights auditing is that it will come to constitute human rights work practiced as of
right on subject populations, who in essence become managed—measured, monitored, and
assessed—using exactly the same sort of processes that typically result in expressions of
power that deny individuals their rights. The “techniques of rule,” that is, are not shifted
by the development of human rights auditing. They are in fact reinforced.”).
50 Sheryl L. Hendriks, The Food Security Continuum: A Novel Tool for
Understanding Food Insecurity as a Range of Experiences, 7 FOOD SEC. 609, 611 (2015).
51 Mahtab Sohrab Bamji et al., Nutritionally Sensitive Agriculture—An Approach to
Reducing Hidden Hunger, EUR. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1, 2 (2020).
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international policy in military-security lexicon, with any ensuing
impact being left to second-class consideration. 52 For example, they
have turned a blind eye on the fact that the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) 53 applies if
not to Gaza, which is isolated but not directly controlled by Israel,
at least to the occupied territories of the West Bank, 54 as reaffirmed
by the International Court of Justice. 55 There, Palestinians are not
starved by employing the most traditional (and overtly condemned)
warfare methods, but brought to the most extreme edge of starvation
by means of induced water shortage, 56 trade restrictions, punitive
waiting times, physical barriers, checkpoints, missing judicial
review, income waste, destruction of cultivated soil by the settlers,57
and surveillance techniques impairing their capability to feed
themselves adequately. Indeed, ‘capability’ is defined as “an
individual’s potential for performance of actions or achievement of
desired outcomes through the intentional exercise of deliberate and
autonomous activity,” 58 and it is a context-sensitive parameter

See The Traditional Security Concept, 40 ADELPHI PAPERS 9, 13 (2000)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
54 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations: Israel, ¶¶ 15, 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (May 23, 2003).
55 See Diana Kearney, Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity, 46 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POLS. 253, 277–78 (2013).
56 See Bruce Mitchell, Innovations and Challenges Related to Resource and
Environmental Management, in SPATIAL DIVERSITY AND DYNAMICS IN RESOURCES AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 113, 122 (Ashok K. Dutt et al. eds., 2015). In this piece, water
shortage is not mentioned as an independent phenomenon, but rather, for its direct bearing
on the affliction of micronutrients deficiency, when coupled with the trade, movement and
market restrictions unlawfully imposed by the Israeli on the Palestinians.
The negative consequences of water shortages for food production and other
economic activities, and the possibility that such shortages could lead to regional
conflict or wars, were the triggers for the concept of ‘virtual water.’ Virtual water
was conceived . . . to allow water-scarce countries to reduce problems by
importing food requiring significant water inputs. By adopting a virtual water
strategy, and importing the foodstuffs requiring high amounts of water input,
governments in water-stressed or water-deprived countries could meet food
security needs despite a limited water endowment. (emphasis added).
Id.
57 See Tariq Dana, Localising the Economy as a Resistance Response: A
Contribution to the “Resistance Economy” Debate in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, 15 J. PEACEBUILDING & DEV. 192, 199 (2020).
58 Paul B. Thompson, From World Hunger to Food Sovereignty: Food Ethics and
52
53

194

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

whose intercourse with resources varies constantly, depending on
daily activities, phase of living, weather conditions, and countless
more variables. 59 Notwithstanding this, it is in Gaza that the
repercussions of Israeli policies are felt more dramatically. Israel’s
heavily-criticized economic siege inflicts “scarcity, pain, and
humiliation on the civilian population,” 60 and contravenes the
customary principle that (naval) blockades cannot be implemented
to prevent foodstuffs from reaching civilians. 61 Its enforcement
through law as legalised biopolitics aligns with a trend of blockades
as liberal constructions of meta-warfare in West-derived
modernity. 62 “Is Gaza an experimental lab for the production,
maintenance, and profitability of biopolitical debilitation?” 63
Deplorably, this sounds like a rhetorical question.
In Palestine and beyond, hidden hunger is thus a crucial threat
to the growth of individuals and the development of society, 64 with
appreciable impact on countries’ GDP; 65 even where absolute
poverty fades, hidden hunger still soars. 66 Disability-Adjusted Life
Years (“DALYs”) metrics have been designed by social scientists
Human Development, 11 J. GLOB. ETHICS 336, 336 (2015) (emphasis added).
59 See JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 59 (2009).
60 ORNA BEN-NAFTALI ET AL., THE ABC OF THE OPT: A LEGAL LEXICON OF THE
ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 350 (2018). For a recount
of similar — but not as extreme — dynamics at play in the occupied West Bank, see Aeyal
Gross, Litigating the Right to Health Under Occupation: Between Bureaucracy and
Humanitarianism, 27 MINN. J. INT’L L. 421, 443–48 (2018).
61 See Martin David Fink, Contemporary Views on the Lawfulness of Naval
Blockades, 1 AEGEAN REV. L. SEA & MARITIME L. 191, 200–01 (2011).
62 See Nicholas J. T. Mulder & Boyd van Dijk, Why Did Starvation Not Become the
Paradigmatic War Crime in International Law?, in SITUATING CONTINGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT LAW (Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo
Venzke eds., forthcoming 2021), available at https://www.academia.edu/40699604/
Why_Did_Starvation_Not_Become_the_Paradigmatic_War_Crime_in_International_La
w_Forthcoming_in_Kevin_Jon_Heller_and_Ingo_Venzke_eds_Contingency_and_the_C
ourse_of_International_Law_Oxford_University_Press_ [https://perma.cc/5S3N-RBN3].
63 Jasbir K. Puar, The ‘Right’ to Maim: Disablement and Inhumanist Biopolitics in
Palestine, 14 BORDERLANDS 1, 17 (2015).
64 See Robin M. Houston, Hidden Hunger: A Global Challenge Facing Our
Interdependent World, 5 J. WILDERNESS MED. 146, 149–50 (1994).
65 See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 88–91; see also
Alexander J. Stein and Matin Qaim, The Human and Economic Cost of Hidden Hunger,
28 FOOD & NUTRITION BULL. 125, 131 (2007).
66 See SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES IN THE AGROFOOD SECTOR 12 (Rajeev Bhat ed.,
2017).
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and nutritionists to evidence that whilst quantitative forms of hunger
have fallen drastically in recent decades because of general
improvements in life conditions, hidden hunger is still widespread
due to inequal resource distribution, and it decreases globally at a
disturbingly lower rate. 67 To exemplify, in South-East Asia,
“despite recent progress . . . in terms of economic growth,
agricultural output and exports, poverty reduction and even some
indicators of improved child nutrition, the region’s burden of
micronutrient deficiencies has improved little for several
decades”. 68 Hidden hunger is by no means confined to the Global
South, 69 yet it hits harder when combined with subjugation,
governmental unsuitability and space-control policies which call
into question international law ‘templates.’ Despite this, exiguous
attention has been dedicated thereto at the U.N. level, 70 as well as
67 See Theda Gödecke et al., The Global Burden of Chronic and Hidden Hunger:
Trends and Determinants, 17 GLOB. FOOD SEC. 21, 26–28 (2018); see also Julie C. RuelBergeron et al., Global Update and Trends of Hidden Hunger, 1995-2011: The Hidden
Hunger Index, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2015); Tyler J. Titcomb & Sherry A. Tanumihardjo,
Global Concerns with B Vitamin Statuses: Biofortiﬁcation, Fortiﬁcation, Hidden Hunger,
Interactions, and Toxicity, 18 COMPREHENSIVE REV. IN FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 1968,
1968–69 (2019).
68 Kassandra L. Harding et al., Hidden Hunger in South Asia: A Review of Recent
Trends and Persistent Challenges, 21 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 785, 785 (2018).
69 See SUSTAINING GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY: THE NEXUS OF SCIENCE AND POLICY 499
(Robert Zeigler ed., 2019). According to the United Nations, “[t]his is part of the global
‘nutrition transition’, which is seeing a rise in consumption of energy-dense yet nutrientpoor foods.” U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, ¶ I(A)(9), U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016).
70 See U.N. International Human Rights Instruments, Report on Indicators for
Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc.
HRI/MC/2006/7 (May 11, 2006) (stressing quantitative data – like the “minimum level of
dietary energy consumption” – whilst making no mention of qualitative issues other than
for food not to be poisoned or adulterated). Destaw A. Yigzaw, Hunger and the Law:
Rethinking the Right to Food, 8 n.31, 9 n.34 (2011), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1962391 [https://perma.cc/GQM6-Y9TB]. Therefore, the
problem lies with what performance indicators focus on, and not with how they present
their findings (quantitatively, i.e., with numbers and indices, or qualitatively, i.e.,
narratively). Quantitative international indexes are acceptable or even preferable, insofar
as they quantify both the calory-intake (i.e., ‘quantity’) and nutrient-variety (i.e., ‘quality’)
of food. For another example of shortsightedly quantitative indicator, i.e., the one chosen
for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report
(HDR), see Alexandra Homolar, Human Security Benchmarks: Governing Human
Wellbeing at a Distance, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 843, 849–50 (2015). Regrettably, while this
indicator is tentatively framed in human-security terms, it fails to acknowledge and address
the full spectrum of hunger phenomena as outlined in the present analysis. Id,
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multilaterally more generally; 71 the U.N. Security Council
(“UNSC”) recently turned to famine as a security rather than
developmental matter, 72 but they did not bring hidden hunger to the
table. Virtually no engagement with this concept has been paid by
legal academics, either. Whilst there are dozens of books that at
least tangentially explore the multidimensionality of hidden hunger
from the perspectives of medicine, economics, criminology,
political science, sociology, international relations, biotechnology,
development studies, urban planning, demography, and so forth, 73
the legal implications of this phenomenon to date are carefully
overlooked by most international publicists. In addressing hunger as
a full-spectrum dimension of human security, lawyers should then
embed themselves in critical attitudes producing “situated
knowledge . . . rather than representing a detached striving for a
virtuosic solo.” 74 Only one single (although seminal) study has
71 Resoundingly, the negotiations towards the 2012 Food Aid Convention focused
on donors’ obligations with respect to minimal monetary value or quantity-weight of food
supply, rather than concurrently setting obligations related to such food’s actual nutritional
provision; the Convention takes a holistic approach in that it does refer to adequacy of
food provision, yet it remains vague on the operationalisation of said approach. See
Annamaria La Chimia, Food Security and the Right to Food: Finding Balance in the 2012
Food Assistance Convention, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99, 115–20 (2016). Therefore, there
would be no surprise if in a survey on World Food Program’s aid delivery, “quality issues
emerged as the most important limitation, raised in nearly all operations visited for [the]
evaluation. These included delayed or incomplete distributions, inappropriate types of
food, lack of food diversity and low-quality, expired or rotten food. Many interviewees
linked these problems to WFP’s perceived prioritizing of quantity over quality.” See
STEETS ET AL., EVALUATION OF WFP POLICIES ON HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND ACCESS
IN HUMANITARIAN CONTEXTS 7 (U.N. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME 2018),
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000072044/download/
[https://perma.cc/TU3N-FZNP].
72 See Salvatore Zappalà, Conflict Related Hunger, ‘Starvation Crimes’ and UN
Security Council Resolution 2417 (2018), 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 881, 886 (2019).
73 See generally Simone Hutter, Starvation in Armed Conflicts: An Analysis Based
on the Right to Food, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 723 (2019); ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER
DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL
POVERTY (2012); BRUCE CURRIE-ALDER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS,
EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS (1st ed. 2014); JOHN COGGON & SWATI GOLA, GLOBAL
HEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND REGULATORY
CHALLENGES (2013); HIDDEN HUNGER: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE NUTRITION QUALITY
(Hans Konrad Biesalski & Regina Birner eds., 2018). See, e.g., Richard David Semba,
The Rise and Fall of Protein Malnutrition in Global Health, 69 ANNALS OF NUTRITION &
METABOLISM 79, 79–88 (2016).
74 Jonathan Luke Austin et al., Doing and Mediating Critique: An Invitation to
Practice Companionship, 50 SEC. DIALOGUE 3, 7 (2019).
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been conducted on the matter through the lenses of IHL or IHRL,
remedying the lacuna that facing food security “crises often attract
more attention than do widespread and persistent vulnerabilities.” 75
The study concerns the Gaza puzzle introduced supra, with an
implicit accent on the engineering of ‘pretended humanitarianism’
as spectacle:
Food-power mechanisms [can be] used to manipulate food
transfers as a means of warfare, punishment, and humiliation of
civilian populations . . . [F]or a population “on the verge of
humanitarian disaster,” . . . the part is not played because their
harms are not visible, and the spectators, be they the courts of law
or the courts of public opinion, are not as alert to the harm as they
would be if those who suffered “looked” their part. Thus, the
deliberation of whether or not “hunger” exists in Gaza that was
conducted, for example, by the Turkel Commission missed the
“hidden hunger” . . .
. The accepted international law
understanding of the right to food . . . rejects the “minimum
standard” approach manifested in the Israeli Red Lines Document
and inherent to the Turkel Commission’s position on the matter,
namely that Israel has met its duty towards the population in Gaza
if conditions of starvation have not arisen. 76

The RTF also stands as a precondition for achieving the
fulfilment of the right to health: 77 besides the most visible
manifestations of malnutrition per se, poor diet is an underlying
factor in noncommunicable diseases, 78 particularly for those whose
immune system was weakened because of the hunger-disease spiral
AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
242 (2017).
76 Aeyal Gross & Tamar Feldman, “We Didn’t Want to Hear the Word ‘Calories’”:
Rethinking Food Security, Food Power, and Food Sovereignty—Lessons from the Gaza
Closure, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 379, 383 (2015). One relevant highlight is that “contrary
to popular perception, even those who appear overfed might actually be suffering from
hidden hunger.” Yigzaw, supra note 24, at 661 n.24.
77 See, e.g., Athanasia ‘Sia’ Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Human Rights, Globalisation,
Trade and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK
373, 380 (Catarina Krause et al. eds., 2012); Brigit C. A. Toebes, International Health
Law: An Emerging Field of Public International Law, 55 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 299, 308–18
(2015).
78 See Emilie K. Aguirre, The Importance of the Right to Food for Achieving Global
Health, 9 GLOB. HEALTH GOVERNANCE 164, 167 (2015); Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 25 (2020) on Science and Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (arts. 15 (1) (b), (2), (3) & (4) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/25, ¶ 66 (Apr. 30, 2020).
75

OF OCCUPATION

198

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

effect. 79 It is equally accepted, more generally, that human rights
are interrelated and interdependent; 80 this is a principle
underpinning one of the main lines of reasoning employed to
counter the argument that economic, social, and cultural rights
represent policy benchmarks more than provisions creating
obligations (contrary to civil and political ones). 81 If that was the
case, the RTF, for example, would be considered too costly 82 and
idealistic for accomplishing its progressive realisation and full
justiciability. 83 Instead, States enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation about the specific conduct to adopt as to attain socioeconomic rights, 84 but not necessarily about its timing, 85 so that
they shall immediately fulfil their ‘minimum core’ duties: 86 “a
progressively realized obligation to protect people’s resource base

79 See Ana Ayala & Benjamin Mason Meier, A Human Rights Approach to the
Health Implications of Food and Nutrition Insecurity, 38 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1, 3 (2017).
80 See Gillian MacNaughton & Mariah McGill, The Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights: Mapping the Evolution of the Right to Health, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL HEALTH: RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 463, 476–77 (Benjamin Mason Meier & Lawrence Oglethorpe Gostin eds., 2018);
see also HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 180–96.
81 Eibe H. Riedel, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra note 77, at 136 (Catarina Krause et
al. eds., 2012); cf. Schmid, supra note 3, at 526 n.7.
82 Riedel, supra note 81, at 138.
83 Id. at 139.
84 See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in
International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 917 (2005).
85 See also Katharine G. Young, Waiting for Rights: Progressive Realization and
Lost Time, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 654, 665–78 (Katharine G.
Young ed., 2019).
86 See Pierre Thielbörger, The “Essence” of International Human Rights, 20 GER. L.
J. 924, 935 (2019). Elaborating on this, the idea we propound entails a radical paradigmreversal as far as timing is concerned: from our perspective, ‘minimum core’ is not
identified with acute hunger, followed by progressive improvements in chronic (hidden)
hunger; contrariwise, it concerns a minimum nutritional attainment which should trigger
neither state of hunger at any single point in time, that is, from the very outset as well.
Phrased differently: for us, fighting hidden hunger is not the second and secondary phase
of the progressive obligation that comes after acute hunger has been completely eradicated
(which will likely never happen), but rather, it is a necessary component of the core of the
obligation that needs to be satisfied up to an elementary standard from the very beginning.
Indeed, in our view (as defended in what follows), hidden hunger is not less severe than
the acute one, but just a qualitatively different, equally dangerous, and mostly
simultaneous manifestation of complex interdependency between malnutrition, poverty,
neglection, dispossession, and repression.
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for food requires immediate steps to be taken, including the
adoption of legislative measures.” 87 On top of that, in legal and
practical terms, it must be admitted that “[w]ithout the right to an
adequate standard of living, . . . civil and political rights would . . .
be rendered meaningless.” 88 In fact, neither the three landmark
systems (1950 European Convention on Human Rights, 1969
American Convention on Human Rights, 89 1981 African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights) nor the 2004 Arab Charter on
Human Rights contain stand-alone provisions about the RTF;
further, the RTF is only mentioned in passing by the embryonic
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 90 (as
well as by several domestic Constitutions and ordinary legislation
around the planet 91). The interplay between the right to food and
that to health is beneficial for addressing hidden hunger, as the right
to health “embraces . . . conditions in which people can [live] a
healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health,
such as food and nutrition.” 92 Contrariwise, it must be noticed that,
as strange as it sounds, the incorporation of the RTF into the one to
life may jeopardise the justiciability of the causes of hidden hunger.
This surfaces in regional human rights arrangements, where the
denial of access to food can be heard before the relevant courts as a
Hutter, supra note 73, at 741.
Riedel, supra note 81, at 137.
89 Except for the 1998 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, also known as “Protocol of
San Salvador,” art. 12, which is not directly enforceable. See Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga,
The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties:
Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System,
31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 173 (2013).
90 See ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN],
art. 28 (Nov. 18, 2012).
91 See BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 441; see also , INT’L DEV. L. ORG.,
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 5 (2014), https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/Realizing%
20the%20Right%20to%20Food_Legal%20Strategies%20and%20Approaches_executive
-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5VK-G4YZ]; JACQUELINE HANOMAN, HUNGER AND
POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE HIDDEN FACES OF FOOD INSECURITY 10, 26–27 (2018);
Nadia C. S. Lambek & Priscilla Claeys, Institutionalizing a Fully Realized Right to Food:
Progress, Limitations, and Lessons Learned from Emerging Alternative Policy Models, 40
VT. L. REV. 743, 753–59 (2016) .
92 Isabella Rae, Women and the Right to Food: International Law and State Practice,
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 17–18 (2008), http://www.oda-alc.org/documentos/1352638973.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P58R-PNAP] (emphasis added).
87
88
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corollary of the violation of the right to life, but only when such
denial amounts to ‘common’ starvation whose severity would lead
to death in the short run, 93 or when the “destruction of subsistence
food supply” 94 is at stake. Recent developments may challenge this
assumption, yet their implications are all to be demonstrated, given
their possibly overambitious scope: the U.N. Human Rights
Committee stipulated that the right to life is violated whenever
citizens, regardless of their eventual death, are prevented from
living with dignity, for example in conditions of hunger or
malnutrition. 95 The call for a dignified life (‘vida digna’), for a
beyond-survival life potentially worth living, that somehow
overcomes the blank-letter demarcations between rights, is
increasingly formulated by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights too (especially in the context of the protection of the
living environment 96 ), with mixed results. 97 On another note, in
93 See Christian Courtis, The Right to Food as a Justiciable Right: Challenges and
Strategies, in 11 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, supra note 14, at 329
(2007). A tiny leeway is bestowed by the reconceptualization of the right to life as
something more than the mere contrary of death, allowing for considerations revolving on
the dignity of existence. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General
Comment No. 3: The Right to Life (Article 4), ¶ 36, (Nov. 18, 2015); Villagrán Morales et
al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 144 (Nov. 19,
1999). For a juridical-philosophical critique of ‘human dignity,’ see Philippe-André
Rodriguez, Human Dignity as an Essentially Contested Concept, 28 CAMBRIDGE REV.
INT’L AFF. 743, 751 (2015) (pontificating whether dignity belongs to the private sphere of
any individual, or it is about a ‘core’ of entitlements which should be scrutinised and
enforced by external forces whenever the subjects are unable or unwilling to do them
justice. Moreover, is ‘human dignity’ also a collective entitlement, something superior that
transcends the simple sum of all individuals’ rights and duties?).
94 Ekkehard Strauss, Monitoring and Fact Finding by UN Human Rights
Mechanisms, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RALLYING TO THE R2P
CAUSE? 79 (Mónica Serrano & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2014).
95 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: The Right to Life
(Article 6), ¶ 26, CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018). For another scholarly examination of
this General Comment touching upon the right to food, see Mona Rishmawi, Protecting
the Right to Life in Protracted Conflicts: The Existence and Dignity Dimensions of General
Comment 36, 101 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1149, 1162–67 (2019).
96 Interestingly, human rights to a “healthy environment” and the like can be traced
in more than a hundred Constitutions around the globe. See BURNS H. WESTON & DAVID
BOLLIER, GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF
THE COMMONS 320–28 (2013).
97 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, A “Dignified Life” and the Resurgence of Social
Rights, 18 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 24 (2020); see also ISAAC DE PAZ GONZÁLEZ, THE SOCIAL
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SHADOW AND
LIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 127 (2018); Louis J. Kotzé & Evadne Grant,
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limited and ‘niche’ circumstances, the denial of access to food can
also amount to inhuman and degrading treatment rather than a
violation of the right to life; this occurs when to be at stake is the
quality rather than the quantity of food. In Stanev, before the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), the applicant “was
forced to live in a psychiatric institution in unsanitary conditions
and with insufficient and poor-quality food.” 98 The Grand
Chamber declared to be considerably concerned 99 at the scarce
variety of nutrients intake allowed by the food-provision system
under scrutiny. 100 Less urgent, but still worthy of consideration, is
the “cultural convenience of food and respect for the value-system
of the habitual diet,” 101 which might help furthering our dismissal
for caloric-only understandings of food provision and consumption.
Indeed, beyond-survival eating also stands as a symbolic ritual,
which certain indigenous communities might even experience as a
transformative act of sacredness in symbiosis with their lands. 102
Self-evidently, “the lack of access to food during armed
conflicts exacts a heavy toll on human life and often results from
Environmental Rights in the Global South, in RESOURCE HANDBOOK ON LAW,
ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 86, 107–08 (Philippe Cullet & Sujith Koonan eds.,
2019); Alexandra R. Harrington, Life as We Know It: The Expansion of the Right to Life
Under the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 35 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 337–38 (2013); Alexandra V. Huneeus, Human Rights
Between Jurisprudence and Social Science, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 255, 262–63 (2015);
Naiara Posenato, La giurisprudenza della Corte interamericana in materia di diritti alla
vita e alla proprietà dei popoli indigeni e tribali [The jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court on the rights to life and property of indigenous and tribal peoples], DPCE ONLINE
139, 154 (2018), http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/489/472
[https://perma.cc/6CZM-BHNU]. See generally Mary Beloff & Laura Clérico, Derecho a
condiciones de existencia digna y situación de vulnerabilidad en la jurisprudencia de la
Corte Interamericana [The Right to dignified living conditions and the situation of
vulnerability in the decisions of the Inter-American Court], 14 ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALES [CONST. STUD.] 139 (2016).
98 Ramanujam et al., supra note 18, at 10.
99 Stanev v. Bulgaria, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 140.
100 See id. at 110.
101 Adriana Fillol Mazo, The Protection of Access to Food for Civilians under
International Humanitarian Law: Acts Constituting War Crimes, 14 AGE HUM. RTS. J.
181, 198 at 37 (2020).
102 Lindsey Carol Pointer, Justice Performed: The Normative, Transformative, and
Proleptic Dimensions of the Restorative Justice Ritual 97–98 (2019) (unpublished PhD
Thesis at Victoria University of Wellington), https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/
bitstream/handle/10063/8581/thesis_access.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/Y23WHUNH].

202

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

adverse human agency.” 103 This goes uncontested in conventional
wars, 104 unfolding remarkable ties (or, at times, substantive
overlap) between the state responsibility under IHRL and the
individual responsibility under ICL. 105 On the opposite side of the
spectrum, low-intensity conflicts, whether national or international,
are lengthy in nature as well as exhausting for the involved
populations, and more controversially addressed by international
law. 106 Some of these conflicts are protracted for so long that they
become a structural condition of said populations’ entire existence,
spanning across multiple generations, up to transforming the
‘anthropology’ of certain societal dynamics in the most severe
scenarios. 107 As an anxiety-depleting mechanism that indirectly
leads to protracting conflicts, humans tend to comfort themselves
with convincements of decency-in-continuity that superficially
defuse the call for revolutionary agency (and thus urgency) which
would otherwise be naturally embedded in their perilous life
conditions. 108 In those contexts, the gist of the problem is not
necessarily a lack of food per se, as it generally is in conventional
warfare, but rather the impossibility to access proper aliments.109

EVELYNE SCHMID, TAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
166 (2015).
104 See, e.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., SOWING THE SEEDS OF PEACE FOR FOOD SECURITY:
DISENTANGLING THE NEXUS BETWEEN CONFLICT, FOOD SECURITY, AND PEACE (Cindy
Holleman et al. eds., 2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7821e.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA23T3SV].
105 See Schmid, supra note 3, at 204.
106 See generally Dustin A. Lewis, The Notion of “Protracted Armed Conflict” in the
Rome Statute and the Termination of Armed Conflicts Under International Law: An
Analysis of Select Issues, 101 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1091 (2019).
107 See, e.g., John P. Cann, Low-Intensity Conflict, Insurgency, Terrorism and
Revolutionary War, in PALGRAVE ADVANCES IN MODERN MILITARY HISTORY 107, 117
(Matthew Hughes & William James Philpott eds., 2006); Teddy Atim, Looking Beyond
Conflict: The Long-Term Impact of Suffering War Crimes on Recovery in Post-Conflict
Northern Uganda (2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Wageningen University) (on file with the
Wageningen University & Research Library); Maya Kahanoff, Collective Trauma,
Recognition and Reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in RECOGNITION AS
KEY FOR RECONCILIATION: ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND BEYOND 59 (Yoram Meital & Paula
M. Rayman eds., 2018); L. C. Green, Low-Intensity Conflict and the Law, 3 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMPAR. L. 493, 493–521 (1997); PAUL EDWARD FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER:
HEALTH , HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 30–31 (2003).
108 See Felix Berenskötter, Anxiety, Time, and Agency, 12 INT’L THEORY 273, 284
(2020).
109 See, e.g., Koen Vlassenroot, Salomé Ntububa & Timothy Raeymaekers, Food
103

IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
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Among other causes, hidden hunger manifests itself prominently
when populations “are forced to survive on inadequate diets, eating
almost the same thing every day,” 110 which is a typical condition in
countries under embargo or food rationing and cities under siege, or
where most food sources are contaminated 111 (e.g. as a spillover
effect of conflicts, when factories are retrofitted for armament
production and civilian infrastructure remains unattended). The
fourth Geneva Convention prohibits sanctions from interfering with
the provision of food relief, but if those sanctions are enacted by the
UNSC, the latter is not directly bound by IHL. 112 As for States
instead, do they retain the duty to ‘offset’ their internal
consequences of a war backdrop with a more proactive engagement
with human rights, for instance by providing balanced and healthy
food (or proactively encouraging external actors, like NGOs and the
deputed U.N. specialised agencies, to do so on their behalf, in terms
of humanitarian assistance)? The U.N. Committee on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights answered in the positive, as not only
“States have a core obligation to take the necessary action to
mitigate and alleviate hunger . . . even in times of natural or other
disasters,” 113 but more demandingly, “whenever an individual or
group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right
to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the
obligation to [fulfil] that right directly.” 114 ‘Adequacy’ is
formulated in qualitative terms too: “[d]ietary needs implies that the
diet as a whole contains a mix of nutrients for physical and mental
growth, development and maintenance,” 115 that is, “sufficient
macronutrients and micronutrients.” 116

Security Responses to the Protracted Crisis Context of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 12 (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.fao.org/3/a-ag307e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JA7D-AZHF] (stating that, in the DRC, “[t]he availability of financial
assets [was] not sufficient to obtain high-quality food, which in turn [led] to shifts in food
patterns to the advantage of cheap but less nutritious products”).
110 Yigzaw, supra note 24, at 661 n.24.
111 See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 370
n.189 (2010).
112 GARY WILSON, THE UNITED NATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 89 (2014).
113 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 10, ¶ 6.
114 Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
115 Id. ¶ 9 (emphasis omitted).
116 Susan Randolph & Shareen Hertel, The Right to Food: A Global Perspective, in
THE STATE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 21, 25 (Lanse

204

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

A strikingly similar situation is replicated in peacetime, when
dictatorial regimes exercise such a wearing control over the
‘citizenry’ that the latter’s capability of accessing the necessary
food resources is impaired; in this sense, lack of food acquires a
significant legal standing, dissimilar to the one originating e.g. from
living conditions induced by a protracted famine. Hidden hunger,
more specifically, becomes a deceitful means of collective
subjugation. Once this stage is reached, one might wonder if
governments can be held accountable, that is to say, whether States’
crafting of situations causing hidden hunger represents a violation
of States’ obligation not to interfere with citizens’ access to the right
nutrients, and if so, to what extent. “It is about shifting the burden
of responsibility from the draught . . . to human beings . . . It is
about challenging the international community’s tolerance of
hunger.” 117 Out of the awareness that the discrepancy between
quantity and quality we call ‘hidden hunger,’ as a widespread and
globalised phenomenon of contemporary times, is not an
unavoidable consequence of ‘raw-material’ shortage but rather
often a by-product of transnational food governance dynamics of
waste and profit whose legal roots have been aptly portrayed by
scholars, 118 this piece will not examine corporate(-dependent)
liabilities; 119 instead, it is dedicated to purely State-driven causes
which are culpably triggered or negligently tolerated.
III. R2P: Novelty, Limits, and Potentialities
The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide
otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations:
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. To try to extend it to cover other calamities . . . would
undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond
recognition or operational utility. 120

Minkler ed., 2013).
117 Yigzaw, supra note 70, at 6–7.
118 See, e.g., Matthew C. Canfield, Compromised Collaborations: Food, Fuel, and
Power in Transnational Food Security Governance, in 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 272,
272–73 (2018); Tomaso Ferrando, Financialisation of the Transnational Food Chain:
From Threat to Leverage Point?, in 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 316, 316 (2018).
119 On these liabilities, see generally Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding
Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691,
711–71 (2006).
120 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 10(b), U.N.
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There is little doubt that the U.N. Charter prioritises the
principles of non-intervention 121 and of (formalistic) sovereign
equality of States, 122 understood as a means to preserve their
territorial integrity and political independence, 123 over the instances
of humanitarian protection: not only does it strictly regulate how to
proceed in the event of international conflicts, 124 but also, and more
meaningfully, it remains silent on how to respond to occurrences of
domestic conflict. In other words, the “Charter’s core commitment
to national sovereignty seemed an insuperable obstacle to
international intervention in conflicts that took place within the
boundaries of a State.” 125 This was restated in subsequent U.N.
documents. 126 Nevertheless, the most intriguing case of interaction
between the RTF and military intervention before the adoption of
the R2P framework is the one related to the oppression of the
Kurdish minority in Iraq, following Iraq’s defeat in the (First)
Persian Gulf War. 127 Since international humanitarian agencies
were not permitted to enter the territory to protect civilians (whose
lives were at risk, and who were starving), the United States’
“administration announced that it would commence dropping
food . . . in partnership with France and the United Kingdom” and,
“when it appeared as if the aid effort was being substantially
compromised . . . President Bush announced unilaterally that U.S.
troops would enter Northern Iraq.” 128 All of this, notwithstanding
the lack of international authorisation to intervene that way: 129 it
Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). See generally Auriane Botte, Redefining the Responsibility
to Protect Concept as a Response to International Crimes, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1029
(2015) (discussing the relationship between these four international crimes and the R2P
genesis and application).
121 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
122 See also Hans Köchler, The United Nations Organization and Global Power
Politics: The Antagonism Between Power and Law and the Future of World Order, 5
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323, 327, 336 (2006).
123 See Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 484,
486 (Malcolm David Evans ed., 2018).
124 U.N. Charter ch. VII.
125 Zifcak, supra note 123, at 484.
126 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the UN (Oct. 24, 1970).
127 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 488.
128 Id.
129 See S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (peremptorily condemning Iraq’s behaviour
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was a calculated political choice, not a (sense of) legal obligation. 130
Along similar lines, although under a broadly phrased UNSC
mandate, U.S. troops invaded Somalia two years later and, despite
failing the mission of facilitating a peace process, they successfully
relieved a quarter million lives from likely death by starvation. 131
In the aftermath of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and
by engaging in fierce debates over NATO’s intervention in
Kosovo, 132 the attitude of the international community towards
matters of ‘compelling’ humanitarian intervention started to
change. 133 A progressivist, globalist rhetoric of fraternal human
agency in history ostensibly abdicated to perfect formal equality of
sovereignties, with the aim of sponsoring a XXI-century re-edition
of Arendt’s “‘right to have rights’ . . . to enjoy human rights as
civil rights protected by one’s own [S]tate.” 134 The International
against humanitarian agencies, yet not endorsing any foreign military intervention).
130 See James Mayall, Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the New World
Order, in POLITICAL THEORY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE ETHICS OF
INTERVENTION, 167, 174–75 (Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman eds., 1993).
[I]t would be imprudent in practice, and wrong in theory, to generalise from the
international obligations towards the Kurds in favour of an international
enforcement mechanism for human rights, wherever they are abused. It would be
imprudent because, however desirable such enforcement might be, the system
would be unlikely to attract either the degree of public support, or the resources,
to make it credible. It would be wrong in theory because the obligation towards
the Kurds does not arise merely from a general principle of human solidarity.
Id. at 174.
131 See Manfred Nowak et al., R2P and the Prohibition of Torture, in RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT (R2P): A NEW PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 293, 298–99 (Peter
Hilpold ed., 2015) see also MELISSA T. LABONTE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS, STRATEGIC FRAMING, AND INTERVENTION: LESSONS FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 64–94 (2013).
132 See Dan Bulley, The Politics of Ethical Foreign Policy: A Responsibility to Protect
Whom?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 441, 445–46 (2010).
133 See Judith Large & Timothy D. Sisk, Democracy, Conflict and Human Security:
Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century, INT’L INST. DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
16 (2006), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/democracy-conflict-andhuman-security-handbook-volume-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2MK-6Y9S];
see also
Stephan Stetter, The Legal Foundations of Normative Borders and Normative Orders:
Individual and Human Rights and the Israel-Palestine-EU Triangle, in FRAGMENTED
BORDERS, INTERDEPENDENCE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS: THE ISRAEL-PALESTINEEUROPEAN UNION TRIANGLE 155, 160 (Raffaella A. Del Sarto ed., 2015); ANNETTE
JANSEN, ANTI-GENOCIDE ACTIVISTS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 195 (2017).
134 Ayça Çubukçu, Thinking Against Humanity, 5 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 251, 254
(2017).
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Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty emphasised, in
its preparatory work leading to the 2005 Summit, the shifted focus
in humanitarian intervention from traditional security to the new
multi-layered paradigms of human security, 135 that is, “from
territorial security, and security through armaments, to security
through human development with access to food and employment”
given that “the security of people against threats to life, health,
livelihood, personal safety and human dignity . . . can be put at
risk . . . by factors within a country, including ‘security’ forces.” 136
We cannot subscribe to the claim that human security necessarily
“decentralizes security away from the State”; 137 all the contrary:
human security compels States to ensure their citizens are safe not
simply because their physical integrity is preserved from deadly
military attacks, but because they need not fear for a decent
existence tomorrow. This was a “distinctly African contribution to
global human rights, with many African [S]tates possessing an
historical tradition of reciprocal rights and obligations which bind
sovereigns and subjects”, as retrievable from the African Union’s
2000 Constitutive Act. 138 The IHRL discourse tenaciously came
into the picture, 139 insofar as it represented the leverage to ‘creep
into the cracks’ of sovereign territoriality 140 and to uphold the moral
supremacy of non-indifference. 141 For example, the concepts of
135 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], Concepts and Dilemmas
of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, 9 OECD J. ON DEV.
61, 69 (2009).
136 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
15
(2001),
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HNW2-Z34K] (emphasis added).
137 Alise Coen, R2P, Global Governance, and the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 19 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 1044, 1046 (2015).
138 SAMUEL JAMES WYATT, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND A COSMOPOLITAN
APPROACH TO HUMAN PROTECTION 182 (2019). Contra Natalie Zähringer & Malte Brosig,
Organised Hypocrisy in the African Union: The Responsibility to Protect as a Contested
Norm, 27 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFF. 1–23 (2020).
139 Indeed, “the rationale for contemporary human rights is founded on the uneven
distribution of power between the [S]tate and its citizens.” BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra
note 2, at 655.
140 Zifcak, supra note 123, at 490–91.
141 Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer & Thomas Cottier, Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
and the Emerging Principle of Common Concern, 9 (Swiss Nat’l Ctr. of Competence in
Rsch., Working Paper No. 29, 2012), https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/9b/
df/9bdf2080-37b0-460f-98bb-d63e418ad88a/responsibility_to_protect_and_common_co
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‘starvation’ (illegal policy involving prolonged non-access to food)
and ‘hunger’ (its physiological consequence) were accompanied
and gradually displaced by the multispectral one of food security,
which is concerned with fundamental dietary needs and minimal
levels of trade freedom and purchasing power as to satisfy said
needs. 142 Following an eloquent endorsement by the U.N.
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, 143 in 2005 the World Leaders’ Summit concluded that
“[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity,” 144 and that should a State manifestly fail to
ensure such protection, the international community would be
entitled to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to make recourse
to any means deemed appropriate in order to prevent those listed
atrocities from occurring. 145 This newly developed doctrine,
articulated in three pillars, 146 rephrased as an obligation of result, 147

ncern_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TNF-A2N8]; see also Anne Orford, Moral
Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 83, 104 (2013).
142 See Catherine Schittecatte, Toward a More Inclusive Global Governance and
Enhanced Human Security, in A DECADE OF HUMAN SECURITY: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
AND NEW MULTILATERALISMS 129, 137–39 (David R. Black & Timothy M. Shaw eds.,
2006).
143 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 492.
144 G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, ¶ 138 (Oct. 24,
2005).
145 Id. ¶ 139.
146 See Fiammetta Borgia, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Between Criticisms
and Inconsistencies, 2 J. ON USE OF FORCE & INT’L L. 223, 224–26 (2015).
147 This is possibly the highest achievement of the R2P codification, although it is
rarely analyzed in literature. With the R2P, when a State fails to provide security and
widespread violations of human dignity are being executed, the international community
reserves the right to intervene even militarily as to relieve the population’s suffering.
Previously, the obligation e.g. to prevent genocide was merely a conduct-based one, that
is the say, the State was mandated to operate under prevention policies, regardless of the
latter’s eventual effectiveness; in the pre-R2P era, if a domestic genocide occurred
nonetheless, the international community was not authorized to intervene (if not
diplomatically) without the express consent of the host government. See, e.g., Carsten
Stahn, Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment: On ‘Red
Lines’ and ‘Blurred Lines’, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 955, 964 (2013) (addressing the nonpunitive dimension of R2P, in the context of R2P’s focus on rescuing civilians from
massive violations of their dignity and rights).
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erga omnes, 148 and subsequently recognised by the UNSC, 149
cannot yet be understood as having the binding force of customary
rules, 150 especially in view of the disagreement over the response to
the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya and Syria 151 between key agents such as
the US, China, Russia, India, Brazil, and the European Union. 152 To
be sure, the R2P had already failed its test prior to the Arab Spring,
in Darfur, where despite “the creation of famine formed part of a
criminal plan to take control over certain areas […] through the
commission of genocidal acts and various crimes against
humanity,” 153 the R2P was employed as a chilling argument against
intervention rather than as a catalysing factor. 154 The optimistic
humanitarianism of just few years before backfired, annihilated by
revamped concerns over “the militarisation of humanitarian aid as a

148 See Hovhannes Nikoghosyan, Government Failure, Atrocity Crimes and the Role
of the International Criminal Court: Why Not Syria, but Libya, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1240,
1243-44 (2015).
149 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 495.
150 See Marco Longobardo, Genocide, Obligations Erga Omnes, and the
Responsibility to Protect: Remarks on a Complex Convergence, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS.
1199, 1203 (2015).
151 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 500–5; see also Rebecca Barber, Is Security Council
Authorisation Really Necessary to Allow Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance in
Syria?, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-security-councilauthorisation-really-necessary-to-allow-cross-border-humanitarian-assistance-in-syria
[https://perma.cc/J74E-ASLA] (discussing alternative legal options available in the Syrian
dossier). Still on Syria, but with reference to the most recent Euro-American strikes in
response to alleged chemical attacks by the al-Assad’s regime on the civilian population,
see generally Agata Klęczkowska, The Illegality of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case
of the UK’s Legal Position Concerning the 2018 Strikes in Syria, 35 UTRECHT J. INT’L &
EUR. L. 35 (2020).
152 See Sankaralingam Pandiaraj, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Reflections on the
Legal Status of the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 795, 811–
12 (2016); see also Zheng Chen & Hang Yin, China and Russia in R2P Debates at the UN
Security Council, 96 INT’L AFFS. 787, 788 (2020); ANDREA S. KOLB, THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS’ RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 365–68 (2017). See
generally YANG RAZALI KASSIM, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INTERVENTION: ASIA AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2014).
153 Randle C. DeFalco, Conceptualizing Famine as a Subject of International
Criminal Justice: Towards a Modality-Based Approach, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1113, 1127
(2017).
154 See Phil C. Orchard, Regime-Induced Displacement and Decision-Making Within
the United Nations Security Council: The Cases of Northern Iraq, Kosovo, and Darfur, in
PROTECTING THE DISPLACED: DEEPENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 101, 121–2
(Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2010).
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form of global governance.” 155 Then, the more pessimistic scholars
argued that “[v]ictims of systemic human rights violations [we]re,
therefore, prey to geopolitics, as they were prior to the establishment
of R2P”. 156 In fairness, humanitarian aid had always been
militarised and, consequently, politicised; 157 the R2P was simply an
attempt at systematising its practice 158 whilst providing it with an
authoritative legal mandate grounded in positive law. This attempt
seemingly failed, but resuming to mere politics is no longer an
option, either. That States “are free to make moral choices” 159
lawfully (or at least, like during the pre-R2P ‘political humanitarian’

155 Kjersti Lohne & Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, Bringing Law into the Political
Sociology of Humanitarianism, 4 OSLO L. REV. 4, 8 (2017).
156 AIDAN HEHIR, HOLLOW NORMS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 11 (2019).
157 See Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian
Intervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1305–11 (2010).
158 Contra Emily Paddon Rhoads & Jennifer Welsh, Close Cousins in Protection: The
Evolution of Two Norms, 95 INT’L AFFS. 597, 601–03 (2019). Their analysis is
geopolitically insightful yet legally flawed. We disagree profoundly that R2P “was
deliberately institutionalized at the 2005 [W]orld [S]ummit as a political rather than a legal
principle” or “positioned as a reinforcer of established legal obligations related to atrocity
crimes.” If it was institutionalized, that is exactly because politics was not deemed
sufficient anymore. Id. at 601, 603. Moreover, the atrocity-crimes-related obligations the
Authors are speaking about were anything but ‘established’ in terms of public international
law that regulates the use of force between sovereigns; they were, in fact, simply criminal
norms transposed at the international level, yet fundamentally concerning individuals (or
at best, human rights norms, but still nothing to do with international security laws).
Premised on these disagreements, we also cannot join the Authors in their argument that
“[p]roponents of R2P did not seek to create new law, but rather to enhance compliance
with [S]tates’ existing legal commitments.” If States now “invoke the morally charged
concept of responsibility primarily as a means to summon up political will, rather than to
establish a concrete plan of action,” that is again a shame for world politics—whose
representatives ignore history of international relations as magistra vitae — and not the
evidence of an R2P failure to deliver legal novelty per se. Id. See Jessica Almqvist,
Enforcing the Responsibility to Protect Through Solidarity Measures, 19 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 1002, 1008 (2015) (arguing that the R2P codified a legal route towards military
intervention, and arguably broadened the scope of state failures to be redressed, which
went further than the generic duties of cooperation in terminating breaches of humanitarian
law which had already been established by both the International Court of Justice and the
International Law Commission); see also Pinar Gözen Ercan, Responsibility to Protect and
Inter-State Crises: Why and How R2P Applies to the Case of Gaza, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS.
1098, 1102 (2015) (discussing how, before the R2P was introduced, most States were
already responsible for protecting their own citizens (more or less comprehensively), but
from a legal standpoint they could not be sanctioned militarily for their failure to do so).
159 DAVID CHANDLER, CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: MORALITY AND
POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59 (2004).
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phase, not definitely unlawfully) has never been falser and more
idealistic a statement.
IV. Fitting R2P’s ‘Crimes List’ in the Burundian Civil Conflict
Political scientists define after-independence Burundi as a rebelto-ruler post-war militarization society. 160 Recent Burundian
history, shaped by the unabating ethnic-motivated conflict between
Hutu and Tutsi groups 161 and by the instability characterising
Africa’s Great Lakes region, 162 can be sorted 163 into three periods:
the civil war lasting approximately from 1993 to 2005, identifiable
as non-international armed conflict (“NIAC”); 164 the two claimedlawful Pierre Nkurunziza’s terms as president of the country; and
the civil unrest erupted again in 2015 following Nkurunziza’s
decision to run for a third mandate, 165 despite Burundi’s own
constitutional provisions. The first period, characterised by
dynamics comparable to those of the neighbouring Rwanda, 166
featured a continued alternation of Hutu and Tutsi regimes, such
that it is virtually impossible to submit that one majoritarian party

160 See, e.g., Andrea Purdeková, Filip Reyntjens & Nina Wilén, Militarisation of
Governance After Conflict: Beyond the Rebel-to-Ruler Frame – The Case of Rwanda, 39
THIRD WORLD Q. 158, 160 (2018).
161 See Rowan Popplewell, Civil Society, Hybridity and Peacebuilding in Burundi:
Questioning Authenticity, 40 THIRD WORLD Q. 129, 134 (2019).
162 See e.g., S.C. Res. 1653 (Jan. 27, 2006).
163 ‘Slightly’ simplistic, yet hopefully, clearly enough for the purposes of the present
analysis. Keeping these dates in mind is essential to appreciate the conflict-hunger
relationship illustrated infra.
164 For the application of the R2P principle to this first phase, see SUSAN C. BREAU,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EMERGING PARADIGM SHIFT
221–24 (2016).
165 See Rossalyn Warren, ‘Fake News’ Fuelled Civil War in Burundi. Now It’s Being
Used Again, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28
/burundi-fake-news-fuelled-civil-war-used-again-resident-nkurunziza
[https://perma.cc/498N-TYEE]. President Nkurunziza died on June 8, 2020, possibly due
to Covid-19. See David Pilling & Andres Schipani, Coronavirus Stalks Burundi’s
Political Elite After President’s Death, FIN. TIMES (June 15, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/a232c62b-ded1-4dd4-8ca7-a5bb5214987f
[https://perma.cc/6KF6-UJ26].
166 See Noel Twagiramungu, Burundi: The Anatomy of Mass Violence Endgames, in
HOW MASS ATROCITIES END: STUDIES FROM GUATEMALA, BURUNDI, INDONESIA, SUDAN,
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, AND IRAQ 56, 74 (Bridget K. Conley-Zilkic ed., 2016); see also
CHARLES T. ‘CHUCK’ CALL, WHY PEACE FAILS: THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF CIVIL
WAR RECURRENCE 150–60 (2012).

212

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

committed crimes against the other minority party. 167 In other
words, while crimes were committed, it is hard to assess which party
they primarily belong to, as well as to univocally identify specific
individuals to charge with those crimes. 168 However, both
investigations become possible vis-à-vis the third period, when not
only the repressive actions can be attributed to the choices of one
precise person (Mr. Nkurunziza), but also, such repression is
targeted against Tutsi rebels by the Hutu ruler. 169 Resultantly, the
case at hand displays a minority persecuted by a majority, and
criminal actions carried out in this framework can fall under the
rubric of both genocide (“acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”) 170
and crimes against humanity (“acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack”). 171 Large-scale RTF
violations are here at play, 172 namely as “serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group” 173 in the case of genocide, or under
the category of “extermination” 174 relevant for crimes against
humanity. More specifically, ‘extermination’ includes the
“intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation
of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the
destruction of part of a population” 175 especially when such
‘conditions of life’ include an irreparably damaged natural
environment, no longer reliable upon for sustenance. 176 The non-

See id.
See id.
169 See BREAU, supra note 164; see also Jeremy Maron, What Led to the Genocide
Against
the
Tutsi
in
Rwanda?,
CAN. MUSEUM FOR HUM. RTS,
https://humanrights.ca/story/what-led-to-the-genocide-against-the-tutsi-in-rwanda
[https://perma.cc/W7B6-5FNV] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
170 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 38544.
171 Id. at art. 7(1).
172 See also Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi,
A/HRC/39/63, ¶¶ 68, 72 (Aug. 8, 2018).
173 Id. art. 6(b).
174 Id. art 7(1)(b).
175 Id. art. 7(2)(b) (emphasis added).
176 See Konstantin Kleine, Will R2P Be Ready When Disaster Strikes? – The
Rationale of the Responsibility to Protect in an Environmental Context, 19 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 1176, 1183–84 (2015).
167
168
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international nature of the conflict precluded the possibility to
invoke the war crime of starvation under the Rome Statute, 177 but
if Burundi were still a party to the Statute, 178 invoking such crime
would have been a viable option for future occurrences thanks to an
amendment tabled in December 2019, 179 which extends the remit
of this war crime to NIACs. Provided that most conflict-triggered
famines pertain to NIACs and not international conflicts, 180 the
177 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8.2(b)(xxv), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (“Other serious violations of the law and customs applicable
in international armed conflict . . . namely . . . [i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians
as a method of warfare.”) (emphasis added); see also Rogier J. Bartels, The Classification
of Armed Conflicts by International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 20 INT’L CRIM. L.
REV. 595, 649 n.268 (2020); Catriona J. Murdoch & Wayne Jordash, Clarifying the
Contours of the Crime of Starvation, EJIL:TALK! (June 27, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/clarifying-the-contours-of-the-crime-of-starvation/
[https://perma.cc/KV5P-55VD]. See generally Deidre Willmott, Removing the Distinction
Between International and Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 196, 196–219 (2004) (discussing the
detrimental limitations of the Rome Statute in differentiating between international and
non-international armed conflict in addressing war crimes). Wisely, domestic jurisdictions
prosecuting war crimes have already disapplied the anachronistic IAC-NIAC distinction.
See Oona Anne Hathaway et al., What is a War Crime?, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 53, 99 (2019).
178 “Burundi deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on 21
September 2004. Burundi withdrew from the Rome Statute, and the withdrawal took effect
on 27 October 2017. The ICC may therefore exercise its jurisdiction over crimes listed in
the Rome Statute committed on the territory of Burundi or by its nationals from 1
December 2004 to 26 October 2017.” See Burndi: Situation in the Republic of Burundi,
INT’L CRIM. CT. [ICC], https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi [https://perma.cc/KB5T-633T]
(last visited Dec. 7, 2020). On the political concerns subsumed under the decision by
certain African jurisdictions to withdraw en masse from the Statute, see Olesya Dovgalyuk
& Riccardo Vecellio Segate, From Russia and Beyond: The ICC Global Standing, While
Countries’ Resignation Is Getting Serious, FILODIRITTO, 17-18 (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.filodiritto.com/sites/default/files/articles/documents/0000002222.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EFV-Y64Q].
179 Resolution ICC-ASP/18/Res.5 on amendments to article 8 of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, adopted at the 9th plenary meeting, on 6 December 2019,
by consensus.
See Rogier J. Bartels, Time to Fix the Rome Statute and Add the Crime
of Starvation in Non-International Armed Conflicts!, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/time-to-fix-the-rome-statute-and-add-the-crime-of-starvation-innon-international-armed-conflicts/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ3Q-JWDD]. Notably, this
amendment will not automatically overwrite the obligations under the Statute for all ICC
members; only those States which will have ratified this particular amendment will be
bound by it, and not even ipso tempore. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute’s Flawed
Amendment Regime — Starvation in NIAC Edition, OPINIO JURIS (July 12, 2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/12/07/the-rome-statutes-flawed-amendment-regimestarvation-in-niac-edition/ [https://perma.cc/9JJG-DE4H].
180 For example, in a press conference on humanitarian crises, the UN Secretary-
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amendment is a historical achievement. Notably, a few domestic
courts and U.N. agencies already operated the same extension, by
arguing that starving civilians as a method of warfare was a war
crime in NIACs too, based on international customary law. 181 In
any case, starvation as a self-standing crime under the Rome Statute,
including extensive phenomena of hidden hunger, can be traced
back to “torture,” 182 or to “other inhumane acts” 183 as a residual
category of crimes against humanity. 184 As for international
humanitarian law, it might well serve as an interpretative device to
international criminal justices, 185 but it will not be scrutinised here:
first, the definitions in international criminal law overlap more
directly with the four listed criteria for assessing R2P violations; 186
second, the IHL threshold on starvation (pursuant to the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions), which is tailored
to the core happening of the hostilities and does not account for their
roots or legacy, is too high and mere-survival-oriented, 187 so much
that no hidden-hunger phenomena could ever be encompassed. 188

General addressed four conflicts, the only international one being that in Yemen. U.N.
Secretary-General, Full Transcript of Secretary-General’s Joint Press Conference on
Humanitarian Crises in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2017-02-22/full-transcriptsecretary-generals-joint-press-conference [https://perma.cc/A6VJ-XDXH].
181 See Federica D’Alessandra & Matthew Gillett, The War Crime of Starvation in
Non-International Armed Conflict, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 815, 825 (2019).
182 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(2)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 38544.
183 Id. at art. 7(1)(k).
184 Manuel J. Ventura, Prosecuting Starvation Under International Criminal Law:
Exploring the Legal Possibilities, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781, 791–94 (2019).
185 See, e.g., KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 364–73 (2004).
186 Or three, if one considers that ethnic cleansing is not separately criminalised under
ICL. The other three international crimes elicited to trigger R2P interventions are
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
187 See Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Conflict Induced Food Insecurity
and the War Crime of Starvation of Civilians as a Method of Warfare: The Underlying
Rules of International Humanitarian Law, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 753, 760–61 (2019).
188 Notwithstanding this, support might be retrieved from a doctrinal understanding
of art. 54(1) of mentioned Protocol, as to encompass starvation “as a […] weapon to
annihilate or weaken the population[.]” See Claude Pilloud & Jean Simon Pictet, Art. 54,
in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 § 2090 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmermann eds., 1987) (emphasis added).
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What is more, civil conflicts do not fit the (possibly obsolete)
rationale of these IHL provisions, as the latter perpetuate a clear
watershed between civilians and combatants, which is untenable
amid irregular, non-traditional conflicts, 189 while the former are
often traversed by ‘rebel,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘mercenary,’ ‘partisan,’ or
‘paramilitary’ forces which IHL would not comprehend among
lawful combatants. 190
Daily life in contemporary Burundi is destabilised by a tangle
of land claims across families and tribes, owing to multi-phase
internal displacement but also “resulting from grabbing
[‘expropriation’] of public land by military and state
representatives.” 191 Indeed, this is a textbook example of what
recent literature labels as ‘post-conflict authoritarian governance,’
whereby ‘frozen conflicts’ are not solved and peacefully ‘left
behind’ but only trapped in a prolonged state of stand-by which
alternates violent outbreaks with spatial coercion, movement
restrictions, hyper-surveillance, top-down property redistribution,
and more generally, illiberal military practices of conflict sectarian
pseudo-management. 192 Because economic rights encourage the
developmental emancipation that jointly with full and free political
standing, leads to self-determination, 193 conflicts—especially civil
ones—are unlikely to reach a settlement if the fighters neglect the
population’s nutritional needs. As for Burundi, since the revival of
protracted low-intensity conflict grounded on ethnical hatred has
been causing acts of genocide and crimes against humanity linked
189 See id. at 764 (“[I]t is permissible/not prohibited to attack objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population, such as crops for example, if in fact they are used
exclusively by enemy armed forces.”).
190 See Hutter, supra note 73, at 738–39.
191 Matthijs Van Leeuwen et al., The ‘Local Turn’ and Notions of Conflict and
Peacebuilding – Reflections on Local Peace Committees in Burundi and Eastern DR
Congo, 8 PEACEBUILDING 279, 286 (2020).
192 See David G. Lewis, John Heathershaw & Nick Megoran, Illiberal Peace?
Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management, 53 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 486, 489
(2018); see also David G. Lewis & Saniya Sagnayeva, Corruption, Patronage and Illiberal
Peace: Forging Political Settlement in Post-Conflict Kyrgyzstan, 41 THIRD WORLD Q., 77,
80, 85–6, 89 (2019).
193 See PATRICK MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (2015).
Remarkably, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has asserted that the
legal significance of development invests its double implications as a means and as an end
in itself. See Simeon A. Igbinedion, Finding Value for the Right to Development in
International Law, 19 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 395, 404 (2019).
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to the starvation of the ethnic minority concerned, which is being
forced to flee the country 194 owing to violence and extreme
hunger, 195 R2P might be legitimately invoked by the international
community. Put differently, famine owing to natural calamity or
other unforeseeable disasters cannot fall within the R2P remit,
whilst state-provoked starvation might be, depending on the
circumstances, such as the configuration of the relevant ongoing
conflict. 196 The link between insufficient food and the likeness of
civil conflicts erupting has been proven, 197 so that the intersection
between insufficient and inadequate food triggers uncontrollable
cycles of misery and brutality. 198 Legally speaking, however,
complicity and indifference shall be distinguished. 199 Borrowing
194 See Anna Dubuis, Burundi’s Last Civil War Killed 300,000. A New One Is
Coming, WORLD (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-28/burundi-s-lastcivil-war-killed-300000-new-one-coming [https://perma.cc/N8UH-NUNH]; Schmid,
supra note 3, at 533 (discussing the implications of state-sponsored creation of severe
living conditions that may satisfy the definition of a war crime).
195 See LAURIE FIELDS DEROSE ET AL., WHO’S HUNGRY? AND HOW DO WE KNOW?
FOOD SHORTAGE, POVERTY, AND DEPRIVATION 168 (1998).
In the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa, food shortage prevailed in cases of active
conflict, such as Angola, southern Sudan, and Somalia – where all sides in the
conflicts used food and hunger as political tools – and in Rwanda, Burundi, and,
to a lesser extent, Kenya – where those driven by violence from their homes faced
both immediate and longer-term food shortages because they could not return to
plant their crops.
Id. (emphasis added).
196 See Schmid, supra note 3, at 533.
197 See Henk-Jan Brinkman & Cullen S. Hendrix, Occasional Paper No. 24: Food
Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges,
WORLD
FOOD
PROGRAMME,
5–6,
12–14
(July
2011),
https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp238358.pdf?
_ga=2.252583691.323270531.1600017816-1633554099.1600017816
[https://perma.cc/T5UX-8HV2]. See generally Henk-Jan Brinkman & Cullen S. Hendrix,
Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks, 2
STABILITY, INT’L J. SEC. & DEV. 1 (2013).
198 See Charles Patrick Martin-Shields & Wolfgang Stojetz, Food Security and
Conflict: Empirical Challenges and Future Opportunities for Research and Policy Making
on Food Security and Conflict, 119 WORLD DEV. 150, 155–56 (2018).
199 “While omissions can indeed be purposive and intended to achieve certain sinister
goals . . . a humanitarian intervention in such an instance would necessarily either be
aimed at forcing the government to take action to help its suffering people or intended as
punishment for failure to take appropriate action. Such a prescription is highly
problematic . . . for two reasons. First, if people are suffering because their government
failed to protect them . . . one must seriously question how probable it is that this
government would be more likely to do so after it was attacked militarily or exactly how
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from the horrific situation in Yemen, 200 issues often arise due to the
difficulties in asserting a causal nexus, given that “the causal link
between action and outcome may not be clear enough to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that remote military or political actors are
responsible.” 201 Several reports would indirectly support such
nexus, where they prove a scientific correlation between levels of
hunger over time and political processes. 202 A large-sample study
revealed that in the period 2008-2017, 54.6% was the projected
percentage of stunted children in Burundi, which would have ranked
it overall as the most hunger-prone country in Sub-Saharan Africa203
and probably worldwide; nevertheless, in order to identify the
interfaces between conflict and hunger, one shall look closer at the
timeline while following the evolution of both unrest and
malnutrition. For instance, although the population of Burundi

this would help the people who are in dire need of assistance. Second, condoning military
intervention against states whose people are made to suffer because of incompetent or
otherwise indifferent leadership leads to the familiar problem of lowering the bar for
military intervention, while also establishing yet another humanitarian pretext for war.”
ERIC A. HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 48–49 (2009). We disagree with the first argument when
the problem is acute hunger, but it might have a holding when the problem is hidden hunger
instead, because its protracted nature would call for long-term corrective actions de facto
equating to military occupation with no expiration date. As explained in this analysis,
hidden hunger is as serious as hunger’s acute manifestations, therefore our disagreement
relates to matters of time and not to arguable ‘disproportions’ between the problem and
the response thereto.
200 See Griffin Paul Jackson, Starvation Is a Weapon, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/starvation-war-crime-syria-yemen-icc.html
[https://perma.cc/D4AS-XTA5] (“Famines . . . are harder to pin to criminal behavior.”).
201 Catriona J. Murdoch & Wayne Jordash, Will Seven Million Starving Yemenis Ever
JAZEERA
(Oct.
2,
2017),
Find
Justice?,
AL
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/million-starving-yemenis-find-justice171002080456552.html [https://perma.cc/4993-7FCG] (emphasis added); cf. Jeffrey S.
Bachman, A ‘Synchronised Attack’ on Life: The Saudi-Led Coalition’s ‘Hidden and
Holistic’ Genocide in Yemen and the Shared Responsibility of the US and UK, 40 THIRD
WORLD Q. 298, 298–310 (2019) (explaining possible links contributing to genocide). On
the Yemeni crisis and its international legal implications, see generally Waseem Ahmad
Qureshi, The Crisis in Yemen: Armed Conflict and International Law, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L.
227 (2020).
202 See, e.g., Martin-Shields & Stojetz, supra note 198, at 154–60 (explaining links
between political processes and food insecurity).
203 See Michael Ekholuenetale et al., Socioeconomic Inequalities in Hidden Hunger,
Undernutrition, and Overweight Among Under-Five Children in 35 Sub-Saharan Africa
Countries, 95 J. EGYPTIAN PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, 1, 4 (2020).

218

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

seven years ago was still the most starving on earth 204 and Burundi
witnessed the world-highest increase in child-hunger rate from
1990-2000, 205 the peace transition reversed the trend 206 and placed
the country on the right track (as measured by the Global Hunger
Index (GHI), which is “more closely associated with hidden hunger
than FAO’s undernourishment indicator” as it “shows statistically
significant correlations with measures of hidden hunger”). 207 The
Burundian government even joined the global Scaling Up Nutrition
initiative in 2013 and drafted a technical nutrition strategic plan in
2014. 208 It was too fragile an improvement, however, to be able to
survive another setback into violence: 209 policymakers should not

204 See INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INS., WELTHUNGERHILFE & CONCERN WORLDWIDE,
2014 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX: THE CHALLENGE OF HIDDEN HUNGER 16 (2014),
https://www.concernusa.org/content/uploads/2015/03/2014GHI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Q4Z-AKEA] [hereinafter 2014 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX]; cf. Ellen
Messer & Marc J. Cohen, FCND Discussion Paper No. 206: Conflict, Food Insecurity,
and Globalization, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INS.,
6 (May 2016),
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/37127/filename/37128.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5RU-3VRH]; id. at 12, n. 6 (showing Burundi’s food insecurity in
2002-2003 and explaining the role of food insecurity in Burundi and other countries).
205 See J. Craig Jenkins, Stephen J. Scanlan & Lindsey Peterson, Military Famine,
Human Rights, and Child Hunger: A Cross-National Analysis, 1990-2000, 51 J. CONFLICT
RESOL., 823, 828 (2007).
206 See 2014 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX, supra note 204, at 14; id. at 41, 44 (providing
data underlying the calculations of the 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2014 global hunger
index scores).
207 2014 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX, supra note 204, at 15; cf. Sumithra Muthayya et al.,
The Global Hidden Hunger Indices and Maps: An Advocacy Tool for Action, 8 PLOS ONE
1, 5 fig. 2 (2013) (depicting hidden hunger index across the world).
208 See Emmanuel Nene Odjidja, 2030 Countdown to Combating Malnutrition in
Burundi: Comparison of Proactive Approaches for Case Detection and Enrolment into
Treatment, INT’L HEALTH 1, 2 (2020).
209 For the latest downturns to violence, see Rick Noack, The U.N. Just Appealed for
More Humanitarian Funds Than Ever Before. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/01/the-u-n-justappealed-for-more-humanitarian-funds-than-ever-before-heres-why/
[https://perma.cc/F8CM-PQ6J]. Compare Elsa Buchanan, Burundi Opposition Claims
Government Is Using Hunger as a ‘Weapon of Mass Destruction,’ INT’L BUS. TIMES,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-opposition-claims-government-using-hunger-weaponmass-destruction-1619166 [https://perma.cc/DC5X-KTEY] (last updated Apr. 28, 2017),
with Klaus Kraemer, Trends Show Where to Focus on Hidden Hunger, HUFFPOST,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-klaus-kraemer/trends-show-where-tofocu_b_9082752.html [https://perma.cc/F2ZF-F3VE] (last updated Dec. 6, 2017), and
Hannah McNeish, Wasting Away in Burundi, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 21, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/02/wasting-burundi-
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be caught off-guard about “patterns of political violence that are
costly and often repetitive . . . [with] low-income countries plagued
by long-term malnutrition, low life expectancy and high infant
mortality.” 210 When conflicts ‘go silent’ without ending, hunger
does not end, either: it ‘goes silent’ too, transiting to a more
structural and less traceable form, which is indeed hidden hunger
and hits civilians indiscriminately.
Moreover, with specific reference to gross violations of the RTF
actively committed in order to reach genocidal or exterminating
goals, one additional element must be taken in due account: the
intentionality of the crime, which is the most unsurmountable
challenge to any prosecutorial strategy in this field. 211 Whilst the
actus reus component of the crime may be relatively easy to prove,
the criminal deliberateness of the conduct (mens rea) might prove
difficult to establish with certainty. 212 Proving the mens rea is even
more demanding when attributing genocidal intentions, because this
would require a dolus specialis; this difficulty is a fortiori relevant
in the context of civil unrest outlined above – recrudesced after
some years of roughly pacific coexistence between the Tutsi and the
Hutu. 213 Remarkably, faced with situations of this kind as well as
inconclusive evidence, international tribunals have shown a
cautious degree of willingness to value contextual elements which,
as a whole, can be deemed indicative of genocidal intent. 214

150218090629874.html [https://perma.cc/8PRM-YQKT], and Jonathan W. Rosen, As
Elections Approach, Burundians Fear a Return to War, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/23/as-elections-approach-burundians-fear-areturn-to-war.html [https://perma.cc/7JQX-SYGR].
210 Frank Haldemann & Akossia Rachelle Kouassi, Transitional Justice Without
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?, in CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 498, 498 (Eibe H. Riedel, Gilles Giacca &
Christophe Golay eds., 2014) (emphasis added).
211 See Wayne Jordash, Catriona J. Murdoch & Joe Holmes, Strategies for
Prosecuting Mass Starvation, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 849, 854, 864 (2019).
212 Id. at 853–54.
213 See id. at 853–54, 864.
214 See NASOUR KOURSAMI, THE ‘CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS’ OF THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE 183–87 (2018). On situational appraisals concerning the crime of starvation
more generally, see GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE & WORLD PEACE FOUND., THE CRIME OF
STARVATION AND METHODS OF PROSECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 16–19 (2019),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Legal%20Paper%20Starvation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3RNF-FPMM].
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V. North Korea: (Hidden) Hunger as (Silent) Violence
Given the State party’s obligation, under article 6 of the [ICCPR],
to protect the life of its citizens and to take measures to reduce
infant mortality and increase life expectancy, the Committee
remains seriously concerned about the lack of measures by the
State party to deal with the food and nutrition situation in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the lack of measures
to address, in cooperation with the international community, the
causes and consequences of the drought . . . which seriously
affected the country’s population in the 1990s. 215

The recent socio-economic history of the Korean peninsula
somehow resembles that of the ‘two Germanies’ from WWII’s
aftermath through the 1990s. After the ceasefire and armistice that
‘ended’ the Korean War and still through the 1970s, although the
whole peninsula was devastated, its Northern part recovered faster;
South Korea was poorer, less industrialised, disadvantaged both
geographically and agriculturally, and more aid-reliant compared to
its Northern counterpart. 216 Less than half a century later, despite
its infamously familistic crony conglomerates (chaebols), South
Korea is a highly advanced, global technological powerhouse, a
maturing democracy, and an aid donor, while almost the totality of
households in North Korea suffer from either insufficient food or
lack of variety thereof; 217 at the time of writing, according to the
United Nations, less than one tenth of North Koreans enjoy
acceptable food consumption. 218 How could this role-reversal
happen so quickly? North Korea is often cited as an exemplification
of (impending) ‘failed State,’ 219 as if its institution were not capable
215 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 12 U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/72/PRK, (July 26, 2001).
216 Joo-Ho Song & Tae-Jin Kwon, Food Security in the Republic of Korea and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Why the Difference?, in FOOD INSECURITY IN
ASIA: WHY INSTITUTIONS MATTER 139, 140 (Zhang-Tue Zhou & Guanghua Wan eds.,
2017).
217 See id. at 163–64.
218 See Tomás Ojea Quintana (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ III(A)(7), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/58 (Feb.
25, 2020).
219 See, e.g., John Van Benthuysen, In-Between Anarchy and Interdependence: From
State Death to Fragile and Failing States, 36 THIRD WORLD Q. 22, 31–32 (2015) (“Clearly
North Korea is a fragile state, indicated by its steady economic deterioration, and a
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of directing the country’s fate, but this label shall be rejected insofar
as its dictatorial regime proves to be the attested cause of this State’s
misfortunes. 220 In fact, “[t]he secretive and autocratic North Korean
regime has been one of the most brutal human rights violators for
the last six decades,” 221 as part of a broader policy design which is
anything but irrational in light of the regime’s priority of selfpreservation. 222
If one compares it to the unrestrained,
hyperconfident revolutionary zeal which had blindfolded
‘Democratic’ Kampuchea’s decision-making in Cambodia, 223
similarities are astounding. North Korea’s extremised, hyperisolationist form of autarchy did not deliver on its promises, and
“has been loath to accept the demands of other governments or
NGOs concerning the production, distribution, and accountability
of its food system.” 224 Food deprivation never happens in a vacuum,
and the responsibilities of the State in its external and internal affairs
shall be appraised holistically, in an integrated and cross-functional
fashion: “a right to food audit should not be limited to examining
policies and programs and should include the legal structures behind
food production.” 225 In ‘nourishing’ terms, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s (“DPRK”) responsibilities for human
rights violations mainly lie in three policies: 1) the sluggish,
negligent, or even obstructed dispensation of international (food)
aid, the acceptance of which burns political capital 226 but shall be

candidate for future state failure”).
220 Charles T. ‘Chuck’ Call, The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’ 29 THIRD WORLD Q.
1491, 1504 (2008).
221 BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 185. See generally Roberta Cohen, Human
Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges, 22 INT’L J. KOR. UNIFICATION STUD.
29, 29–62 (2013) (discussing the grave human rights abuses present in North Korea and
the diverse approaches needed to solve the problem).
222 See Andrei Yamamoto, Unpacking the Ontological Foundation of North Korea’s
Ambivalent Foreign Policy: Brinkmanship as Rationality, 11 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 356,
359–60 (2019).
223 See MAARTJE WEERDESTEIJN, THE RATIONALITY OF DICTATORS: TOWARDS A MORE
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 262–63 (2017).
224 John Feffer, North Korea and the International Politics of Famine, 4 ASIA-PAC. J.
1, 14 (2006).
225 See Kirsteen Shields, Methods of Monitoring the Right to Food, in RESEARCH
METHODS IN HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 333, 348 (Bård A. Andreassen et al. eds.,
2017).
226 See VIRGINIE GRZELCZYK, NORTH KOREA’S NEW DIPLOMACY: CHALLENGING
POLITICAL ISOLATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 205 (2018); Dong Jin Kim, Aid to
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approved nonetheless; 2) the collectivised exploitation of cultivable
soil; 227 and 3) the exasperated restrictions to the free movements of
people and goods, 228 whose lifting is often contingent upon bribing
officials 229 – indeed, “people who live in authoritarian regimes can
buy private space through the payment of bribes”. 230 To this list,
one may add the military overspending, 231 the indiscriminately

the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula, 29 PAC.
REV. 473, 481–4 (2016); see also Mika Aaltola, Emergency Food Aid as a Means of
Political Persuasion in the North Korean Famine, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 371, 375 (1999).
The act of donating food to starving people is overwhelmingly perceived as an
honourable act of kindness; at the same time, however, the act of international
gift-giving does not stop when the donated food is eaten but extends from
humanitarian actions to the realm of international politics in a form of expected
reciprocity. Many contemporary researchers tend not to take gift-giving practices
at their face value but seek to understand the pattern of gift-giving against some
latent economic, social or political interests. . . . Although large-scale food aid
is often donated by governments which perceive themselves as existing in
anarchic conditions dominated by self-help and maximisation of relative
capabilities, the act of gift-giving does contain altruistic, moral and humanitarian
suggestions amid connotations more suitable for political persuasion and power
politics.
Id. at 373.
227 See also KAMER DARON ACEMOĞLU & JAMES ALAN ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 73 (2012).
228 See INT’L FED’N HUM. RTS. [FIDH], MISERY AND TERROR: SYSTEMATIC
VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 10 (2003),
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/north-korea/MISERY-AND-TERROR-Systematic
[https://perma.cc/LD46-7RCT]; STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, FAMINE IN
NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM 169–70 (2009). The problem with the third
policy lies in its extent, as its contrary (a total deregulation of the supply chains and
financialization of the commodities’ exchange price and trade, in accordance with the
neoliberal economic approach) has already proven to be detrimental to a fair distribution
of nutritional resources at the global level.
229 See JUSTIN V. HASTINGS, A MOST ENTERPRISING COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 92 (2016); OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., THE PRICE IS
RIGHTS: THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE
DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
KOREA
2
(2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/KP/ThePriceIsRights_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LAW5-NF6C]; Sang-Hun Choe, Fleeing North Korea is Becoming
Harder, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/world/asia/
crackdowns-make-fleeing-north-korea-harder.html
[https://perma.cc/9FJW-PKWM];
Soo-Am Kim, et al., Relations Between Corruption and Human Rights in North Korea,
KOR. INST. NAT’L UNIFICATION 29–30 (2013), http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/
2015.oak/2239/1/0001458992.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAQ7-R5GB].
230 Philip M. Nichols, The Good Bribe, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 647, 675 (2015).
231 See Serena Timmoneri, Responsibility to Protect and ‘Peacetime Atrocities’: The
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aggressive and centrally planned (i.e., compelled on farmers)
fertilisation of the soil which degraded the nutritional value of
agricultural products over extensive contaminated lands, 232 as well
as—mirroring Palestine’s vicious cycle—restrictions to people’s
movements 233 internationally, but also domestically. 234 Not
satisfied with starving its own citizens, the North Korean regime
disregards its PIL obligation 235 to, for instance, release passports
and smoothen the opening of ‘humanitarian’ corridors as to let
North Koreans escape famine (either temporarily or permanently)
through lawful emigration, provided third States are willing to
welcome them as either refugees or ‘economic migrants.’ 236 These
policies combined have been defined as the ‘silent violence’
Case of North Korea, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1290, 1297 (2015).
232 See Christine Ahn, Famine and the Future of Food Security in North Korea, INST.
FOOD
&
DEV.
POL’Y,
5–8
(May
2005),
https://foodfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/PB11-Famine-in-North-Korea-Christine-Ahn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQ4G-U2D6].
233 See AMNESTY INT’L, STARVED OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FOOD CRISIS IN
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA) 16 (2004),
https://www.Amnesty.Org/Download/Documents/96000/Asa240032004en.pdf
[https://perma.Cc/4auj-Z3sh].
234 See Timmoneri, supra note 231, at 1294 (describing how “forced internal
resettlement is routine” and access to Pyongyang is “tightly restricted”).
235 This obligation stems from art. 12(2) ICCPR; the DPRK ratified the ICCPR in
1981 to then attempt to withdraw from it in 1997, yet said treaty does not provide for
withdrawal options, therefore the other state parties still consider the DPRK to be a
member. The vague qualifications to art. 12(2) stated in art. 12(3)—“those which are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others”—are nonetheless qualified,
in turn, by the same art. 12(3) in that they shall be “consistent with the other rights
recognized in the […] Covenant”. Among the latter, that to life (art. 6(1)) and, most
relevantly for hidden hunger, that not to be subjected to degrading treatment (art. 7);
furthermore, unqualifiedly, “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence” (art. 1(2)).
236 See generally Jiyoung ‘Jay’ Song, Twenty Years’ Evolution of North Korean
Migration, 1994–2014: A Human Security Perspective, 2 ASIA & PAC. POL’Y STUD. 399
(2015). See China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees: Hearing Before the Cong.Executive Comm’n on China, 112th Cong. 5 (2012) (transcript available at
https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2012.03.05_chinas_repatriation_of_north_kor
ean_refugees.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SGX-HEKU]); Stephy Kwan, More Than an
Ignorant Bystander: Chinese Accountability and the Repatriation of North Korean
Defectors, 26 INT’L J. KOR. UNIFICATION STUD. 95 (2017); Jeanyoung Jeannie Cho,
Systemizing the Fate of the Stateless North Korean Migrant: A Legal Guide to Preventing
the Automatic Repatriation of North Korean Migrants in China, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
175 (2013).
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underlying interstitial mass starvation: top-down suicidal missions
of “titanic social engineering [as] attempts at agro-economic
transformation.” 237 Another policy to be considered is what is
termed as ‘penal starvation,’ which entails starving prisoners to
death (by choice, indifference, and/or incompetence):
[t]he North Korean regime is responsible not only for famine, but
also for a deliberate policy of subjecting its prisoners to starvation
rations. . . . Food is allocated on the basis of productivity: the
less a prisoner produces, the less he eats, resulting in a spiral
downward as those deprived of even more food produce less and
less. Many in the camps die from lack of food, while some are
executed for foraging. Penal starvation does not cause death in the
manner . . . in which malnutrition spreads over wide populations.
Rather, it attacks a significant percentage of prisoners who cannot
live on rations constantly below subsistence level, or whose food
rations are even lower than the prescribed below-subsistence level
because they do not work hard enough or have angered the
authorities in some other way. Estimates of how many people are
in the prison camps at any time vary, but most sources agree on
about 200,000 every year. 238

The convergence of all of these elements is culpably worsening a
humanitarian disaster of catastrophic proportions, where not only
about a million adults died and cannibalism resurged, 239 but half of
all children could not be fed correctly 240 and sixty percent of them,
just two decades ago, were stunted. 241 Indeed, “lack of access to
food is almost never the result of a general scarcity of food. Instead,
people are deprived of food because they have no opportunity to
produce it, cannot earn a sufficient income to buy the food they need
or are unable to work at all.” 242 Even when they produce it,
237 Bridget K. Conley & Alexander William Lowndes ‘Alex’ de Waal, The Purposes
of Starvation: Historical and Contemporary Uses, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 719 (2019).
238 Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, State-Induced Famine and Penal Starvation in
North Korea, 7 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 147, 155 (2012).
239 Id. at 150–51.
240 See, e.g., KOR. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2014
147–48,
178
(2014),
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=AD2E22D6-5542-421C99B0-1AADE4142F2C [https://perma.cc/LJ33-8M5X]; HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note
6, at 64.
241 HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 65.
242 PRISCILLA CLAEYS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT:
RECLAIMING CONTROL 62 (2015).
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corrupted redistribution policies and relational privileges within
society make North Koreans’ starvation a deliberate political act of
disempowerment, 243 enforced by a ruthless regime that “held
rigidly to a self-destructive agricultural system.” 244 Those who are
audaceous enough try to access dark markets, which paved the
foundation for higher rates of disloyalty towards the rulers. 245
Two competing narratives seek to describe different States’
approach to the problem of food production and distribution. The
first, which is dominant and market-driven, is known as ‘globalist
neoliberal,’ encoding “an emphasis on food production,
technological solutions, privatisation, and strong corporate
influence.” The second, which is mostly communist, is known as
‘food sovereignty,’ placing “an emphasis on access to and
distribution of food, local production, and strong opposition to the
privatisation and corporatisation of the food system.” 246
Counterintuitively, perverse mechanism make the two narratives
coincide in contemporary DPRK. Prima facie, one might be
tempted to leverage on the communist, 247 state-driven North
243 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Marzuki
Darusman on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, A/HRC/22/57, annex I ¶ ¶ 3, 6 (Feb. 1, 2013).
244 Donna Lee, The North Korean Famine and Food Shortage: The Problem, the
Politics, and the Policy 13–14 (May 5, 2006) (unpublished Third Year Paper, Harvard Law
School), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/8944674 [html://perma.cc/LP7A-GPP9].
245 See Jonathan R. Corrado, Rise of the Disloyal: Increasing Resentment in North
Korea, 48 ASIAN AFF. 445, 455 (2017).
246 Anne Saab, International Law and Feeding the World in Times of Climate Change,
9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 288, 290 (2018).
247 Technically, that of North Korea is a socialist economic system, as enunciated in
its Constitution itself. However, by way of simplicity and in order to emphasise the
autarchic rhetoric of its ‘developmental’ trajectory vis-à-vis international markets, we
have preferred to reiterate the rather inaccurate capitalist/communist dichotomy. On
DPRK’s ‘constitutional’ socialism see, for example, Barry K. Gills, North Korea and the
Crisis of Socialism: The Historical Ironies of National Division, 13 THIRD WORLD Q. 107
(1992); Justine Guichard, In the Name of the People: Disagreeing over Peoplehood in the
North and South Korean Constitutions, 4 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 405, 417-27 (2017); DaeKyu Yoon, The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1289 (2003); Bui Ngoc Son, Globalization of Constitutional Identity, 26 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 463, 527-9 (2017); Patricia Goedde, Beyond Sham: The North Korean
Constitution, 44 ASIAN PERSP. 1 (2020); Robert Weatherley & Jiyoung ‘Jay’ Song, The
Evolution of Human Rights Thinking in North Korea, 24 J. COMMUNIST STUD. &
TRANSITION POL. 272, 278-82 (2008); Albert Hung-yee Chen, Pathways of Western
Liberal Constitutional Development in Asia: A Comparative Study of Five Major Nations,
8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 849, 871-73 (2010); Gary Alexander Stradiotto & Sujian Guo, Market
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Korean case to disprove the increasingly mainstreamed argument of
all those who claim that food crises and shortages globe-wide
mostly owe to West-modelled neoliberal market forces’ “emphasis
on privatisation, deregulation and, crucially, commodification.” 248
Nonetheless, said conclusion would be misleading insofar as the
“profitable capital accumulation by transnational economic élites”
is not absent in regimes like the North Korean one. 249 It is hyperconcentrated in the hands of a few rulers and related population
strata 250 who employ propaganda-supported pseudo-egalitarian
discourses to keep the (largely majoritarian) rest of the population
underfed and underdeveloped. 251 These authoritarian ‘leaders’ thus
have no interest in distributing across the citizens (by means of
accountable policy implementation) all the benefits of their share of
transnational capital-accumulation mechanisms which occur along
globalised food supply-chains; North Korean ‘leadership’ prefers
“to sacrifice the rights — and lives — of those it perceives as
disloyal or class enemies,” 252 and more generally of all those who
are not double-stranded with and ‘useful to’ the power-élite. 253
Socialism in North Korea: A Comparative Perspective, 12 J. ASIA PAC. ECON. 188, 199201 (2007).
248 Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV. 532, 535
(2011).
249 Id. at 536; see also Note by the President of the Security Council, S/2017/150, ¶¶
210–55 (Feb. 27, 2017). See generally CTR. FOR ADVANCED DEF. [C4ADS] &
세종연구소[THE SEJONG INSTITUTE], The Forex Effect: US Dollars, Overseas Networks,
and
Illicit
North
Korean
Finance
(2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5a3292079140b73f7
3f92efd/1513263687907/The+Forex+Effect.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QUH4-XDXB];
Richard S. Tracey, Using the PATRIOT Act to Turn North Korea’s Dirty Money into a
Bargaining Chip, 3 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 124 (2009).
250 See Haggard & Noland, supra note 228, at 56, 74.
251 See John M. Friend, A Cultural Neuroscience Perspective on North Korean
Strategic Culture: Implications for Tailored Deterrence, 37 POL. & LIFE SCI. 156, 161
(2018); Woo-Suk Jun, A Study on the Incapacitation Mechanism Model of the Juchist and
Marxist-Leninist Articles Against the Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the
Fundamental Rights Articles in the North Korean Constitution: North Korea’s Violations
of Fundamental Rights and International Human Rights Treaties 128–31 (Mar. 13, 2014)
(unpublished S.J.D. Thesis, University of Kansas) (on file with author).
252 HUM. RTS. WATCH, NORTH KOREA: A MATTER OF SURVIVAL: THE NORTH KOREAN
GOVERNMENT’S CONTROL OF FOOD AND THE RISK OF HUNGER 3 (2006),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/northkorea0506/northkorea0506webwcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YRK-N37G].
253 See ANDREĬ NIKOLAJEWITSCH LAN’KOV, THE REAL NORTH KOREA: LIFE AND
POLITICS IN THE FAILED STALINIST UTOPIA 115 (2013); Boris Kondoch, The Responsibility
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The country being factually in peace, 254 no war crime can be
attributed to its leaders; also, no specific group is targeted, which
excludes the possibility to invoke genocide. With reference to the
R2P, the only relevant attribution would be that for crimes against
humanity, 255 as civilians are violated arbitrarily. 256 Abovementioned precedents in Darfur regrettably set the rule that aid
obstruction does not suffice for invoking the R2P, 257 and North
Korea was one of the six countries expressing open hostility at the
principle before the UN. 258 Strategic concerns also fall into the
scheme, adding to the unfeasibility of the R2P option:
the international community, the US, China, and South Korea all
agree that their first strategic priority is a stable North Korea that
does not develop or use nuclear weapons. No [S]tate or
international organization has invoked the evolving principle of
the responsibility to protect with regard to North Korea. The
preferred option appears to be to simply wait for change. 259

Shifting from charges upon state representatives (mainly
inspected in the case-study on Burundi) to those upon States
themselves, the most comprehensive framework to be pointed to is

to Protect and Northeast Asia: The Case of North Korea, 24 KOR. J. DEF. ANALYSIS 433,
442 (2012).
254 Formalistically speaking, a peace treaty between the two Koreas has never been
signed, therefore the two countries are technically belligerent parties still. However, we
will adopt a factual perspective here, all the more considering that germinal gesturepolitics of détente have been deployed in recent years. Wars which are factually ended but
only accomplish a legal acknowledgement of this reality decades or even centuries later
are usually known as ‘extended wars’ (or ‘perpetual wars’ when latent hostilities remain,
resulting in occasional and minor outbreaks of military violence and strongly-worded
‘diplomatic’ confrontation – which is in itself an oxymoron).
255 Timmoneri, supra note 231, at 1293–95, 1300.
256 Howard-Hassmann, supra note 238, at 158–59.
257 Daniel Fiott & Marie Vincent, The European Union, in AN INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 199, 214–15 (Gentian Zyberi & Kevin T.
Mason eds., 2013). This ‘rule’ does not fulfil the requirements of international customary
law, therefore it could be easily neglected if only, as explained previously, the R2P itself
was not ineligible as a legal custom.
258 ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
20 n.90 (2011).
259 Howard-Hassmann, supra note 238, at 160 (emphasis added); see also Ido
Kilovaty, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea: Green Light for Humanitarian Intervention, 6 CRIEGHTON
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 22 (2015).
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the ICESCR one, 260 which calls upon States to “recognize the right
of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . . including
adequate food” 261 by “recognizing the fundamental right of
everyone to be free from hunger.” 262 The Covenant further specifies
that “the State may subject [the rights embodied thereof] only to
such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may
be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
society.” 263 In the case under examination, neither the society is a
democratic one (where the objectives of public welfare are more or
less directly set by the citizens), nor the nature of the RTF shall be
deemed compatible to any limitation promoting welfare objectives;
therefore no limitation is applicable.
The danger of hidden hunger, “caused by eating food that is
cheap and filling, but deficient in essential vitamins and micronutrients,” 264 is always around the corner in dictatorial regimes, as
they cause restrictions to the circulation of ‘educational wisdom’
related to food quality. 265 The ICESCR confirms that States “shall
take . . . measures which are needed to improve methods of
production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use
of technical and scientific knowledge[, as for] everyone to . . . enjoy
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.” 266 Thereby,
a strict interconnection between the right of non-discrimination in
accessing information and the right to nutrient, healthy, and
balanced food can be verified, 267 just like in Palestine, where all
260 To which the DPRK is a party (accession date: 14 Sept. 1981), in line with former
USSR-satellite countries’ self-professed predilection for the endowement of economic
rights (which, in practice, degenerated) over political ones at the UN level.
261 ICESCR, supra note 53, art. 11(1) (emphasis added).
262 Id. art. 11(2).
263 Id. art. 4.
264 Sven Söllner, The ‘Breakthrough’ of the Right to Food: The Meaning of General
Comment No. 12 and the Voluntary Guidelines for the Interpretation of the Human Right
to Food, 11 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 391, 401 n.19 (2007).
265 See id. at 401; cf. Eileen Kennedy et al., Alleviating Hidden Hunger: Approaches
That Work, 45 IAEA BULL. 54, 59 (2003).
266 ICESCR, supra note 53, arts. 11.2(a), 15.1(b); see also Hans Morten Haugen,
Human Rights and Technology—A Conflictual Relationship? Assessing Private Research
and the Right to Adequate Food, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 224 (2008).
267 Söllner, supra note 264, at 401; Patrick Webb and Andrew L. Thorne-Lyman,
Entitlement Failure from a Food Quality Perspective: The Life and Death Role of Vitamins
and Minerals in Humanitarian Crises, in FOOD INSECURITY, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN

2021

HIDDEN HUNGER IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME

229

authorised development stakeholders joined forces and translated
the circulation of informational wisdom “into the Water Sector
Working Group, a forum for information-sharing between the
Palestinian Water Authority, donors, and international and local
implementing agencies, including humanitarian actors.” 268
International agencies, whose work is obstructed in the DPRK,
usually play a central role in raising awareness about and socialising
scientific standards. 269 As food quality is intrinsically dependent on
freedom of movement (of people and goods), prosperity awareness
bears relevance as well:
[n]ews of the prosperity of China and South Korea filters into
North Korea via returned refugees and via traders who smuggled
videos and DVDs in from China. The more North Koreans
encounter goods from the global marketplace and visitors from
the rest of the world, the harder it is for the regime to trumpet its
nonsensical propaganda about being the best country in the
world. 270

Furthermore, where post-harvest waste couples with endemic
poverty, hidden hunger is the most automatic and immediate

RIGHTS FAILURE 243, 245 (Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, Shabd S. Acharya & Benjamin G.
Davis eds., 2007). See generally Kennedy et al., supra note 265 (discussing various
methods to eliminate hunger through, among other things, increasing information access).
The most recent research confirms that also in light of the growing world population,
micronutrients deficiency cannot be eradicated unless all States gain access to relevant
technologies and their citizens are properly informed and educated; ending malnutrition
requires concerted, three-step efforts: biofortification (science), dietary interventions
(education), and industrial food fortification (industry). Hence, the circulation—and
possibly application—of international scientific wisdom and the access to related
technologies and educational tools is of the essence, so that it should never be impaired or
procrastinated on the part of state authorities. See Dominique Van Der Straeten et al.,
Multiplying the Efficiency and Impact of Biofortification Through Metabolic Engineering,
11 NATURE COMM. 1, 7 (2020). On biofortification techniques as applied to the curse of
hidden hunger, see generally Priyanka Sharma, Poonam Aggarwal & Amarjeet Kaur,
Biofortification: A New Approach to Eradicate Hidden Hunger, 33 FOOD REV. INT’L 1
(2017). Fortified aliments are promoted at the U.N. level, too. See Human Rights Council,
Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur (Mr. Olivier De Schutter) on the Right to
Food, A/HRC/19/59, ¶¶ 19–21. (Dec. 26, 2011).
268 Edoardo Borgomeo, Delivering Water Services During Protracted Armed
Conflicts: How Development Agencies Can Overcome Barriers to Collaboration with
Humanitarian Actors, 101 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1067, 1082 (2019).
269 See Nita Dalmiya & Werner Schultink, Combating Hidden Hunger: The Role of
International Agencies, 24 FOOD & NUTRITION BULL. 69, 73–75 (2003).
270 Howard-Hassmann, supra note 238, at 160–61.
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outcome. 271 “[L]osses occur[ring] within the post-harvest,
processing and distribution stages of the food chain — likely as a
result of poor management, refrigeration, and preservation practices
during storage and transportation [produce disproportionately
negative effects on] . . . micronutrient-rich commodities such as
fruits, vegetables and animal products,” 272 and post-harvest losses
in North Korea account for half of the total production. 273 North
Korea’s forced insulation from global supply chains, regardless of
the latter’s own imperfections, is dramatically harming North
Koreans’ ability to feed themselves correctly, and it is exacerbating
hidden hunger throughout the country. The chronic antidevelopmental characteristics of the malnutrition affecting DPRK’s
society and its physiological repercussions on the population 274
stand as ‘self-contained’ evidence that acute famine exacerbated by
natural draughts has always been accompanied by long-term hidden
hunger, caused by the culpable negligence or even the deliberate
choice of North Korea’s dictators.
VI. Conclusions
In the broadest terms, “there is no thought of invoking even the
most innocuous prescriptions of R2P to respond to massive
starvation in the poor countries.” 275
At this stage, the
impracticability of any claim by the international community to
enjoy a legally grounded power to intervene to counter hiddenhunger phenomena related to state leaders’ misconduct should
emerge evidently. There are two main issues at stake: the first
concerns the difficulty in objectively identifying one of the four
R2P-relevant ‘listed crimes’ by establishing a nexus with the RTF
violation due to a population’s hidden hunger with their related

271 Nevin Stewart Scrimshaw, The Consequences of Hidden Hunger for Individuals
and Societies, 15 FOOD & NUTRITION BULL. 1, 17 (1994).
272 Hannah Ritchie, David S. Reay & Peter Doyle Higgins, Quantifying, Projecting,
and Addressing India’s Hidden Hunger, 2 FRONTIERS IN SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS. 1, 8
(2018).
273 MOHAMMAD U.H. JOARDDER & MAHADI HASAN MASUD, FOOD PRESERVATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 31 (2019).
274 See Haggard & Noland, supra note 228, at 195–97.
275 Avram Noam Chomsky, Statement by Professor Noam Chomsky to the United
Nations General Assembly Thematic Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect 5 (July 23,
2009) (transcript available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/president/63/pdf/calendar/
20090723-resptoprotect.pdf) [https://perma.cc/55WG-YY5V].
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mental element (when applicable); the second originates in the R2P
focus on preventive (or at least in medias res) interventions 276
rather than post factum ‘corrective’ interferences with actions which
took place within a State. While the first hurdle can somehow be
overcome, the second must confront itself with blurred field realities
and hybrid legal-political vindications. In fact, hidden hunger being
the long-term effect 277 of deeply rooted and multidimensional
shortages, setting a hic et nunc would be extremely challenging in
any (wartime or peacetime) context. Furthermore, it can be argued
that at least in times of war, the ‘ante-R2P’ regime would have been
factually more efficient, because vaguer, and as such proner to
unilateral humanitarianism; this has been demonstrated in multiple
scenarios, the (unlawful, yet ethically justifiable?) 278 U.S.
resoluteness reported in Section III being one of them. This is where
international politics and law more positively come together, in their
common attempt to ensure that a minimum threshold in the
protection of human rights is attained.
Conversely, in insulated legal terms, the R2P represents a
considerably more permissive framework, shaped by a rough yet
substantial departure from the ancient sternness of sovereignty.
Consequently, and taking into consideration that hidden hunger
remains less straightforwardly addressable within regional human
rights protection systems, 279 there would be reasonably optimistic
prospects for the agreement and implementation of supplementary
See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 496–98.
See Schmid, supra note 3, at 532 (“[A] massacre by firearms or machetes is more
likely to attract the attention of international criminal lawyers than the slow deaths of those
willfully deprived of food[.]”). This is even more dramatically true for hidden hunger.
278 Or, phrased differently, ‘illegal but legitimate’ – a formula widely commented
upon by scholars and practitioners, with reference to different contexts. See, e.g., JACK
DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 265 (3d ed. 2013); see
also Michael Grant Ignatieff, The Duty to Protect, Still Urgent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/opinion/the-duty-to-protect-still-urgent.html
[https://perma.cc/XX3W-6RA8]; Ian Hurd, Bomb Syria, Even if It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-isillegal.html [https://perma.cc/5LCA-KJNB]; Marko Milanović, Illegal but Illegitimate?,
EJIL:TALK!
(Apr.
10,
2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/illegal-but-legitimate/
[https://perma.cc/T7VT-XYAB]; MICHAEL W. DOYLE, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION:
JOHN STUART MILL AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 122 (2015).
279 See e.g., BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 706–07 n.56. Even though, for
example, the African Union’s power to penetrate into a Member State without the latter’s
consent, is regarded by some as a regionalized reflection of the R2P doctrine–as mentioned
supra.
276
277
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measures at the international plane, in line with the change-gear
inaugurated in New York City in 2005 that somehow
institutionalised the “emerging global cosmopolitanism of human
security.” 280 However, perhaps unfortunately, the R2P clearly lacks
political support as it stands now, thus a fortiori when expansions
of its scope are contemplated.
To borrow from ‘peace literature,’ what we need in order to
complexify our understanding of the right to food by freeing it from
a starvation lexicon, is “a kind of framing knowledge (savoir),
which is intimately linked to power and enables the more
superficial, ‘surface’ knowledge of connaissance to make sense.” 281
Connaissance rests itself at the appearance level, content with
assuming there is no hunger wherever some calories are provided
and individuals look healthy; 282 savoir digs deeper through the
structure of society, into the inner texture of power, and argues that
hunger does exist whenever quality food is not freely accessible.
This ‘hidden hunger’ concretises with someone’s ill-will; it
materialises any time the rulers formulate a discourse of coercion
that impairs economic freedom and societal development. This
work has shown the way a discourse of coercion can conceal itself
under the surface of allegedly different regimes, during wartime or
peacetime alike, regardless of the legal applicability of the R2P
framework as it ‘stands’ (does it?) today.
The present analysis, building on the two opposite yet specular
case studies of Burundi and North Korea, also demonstrated that the
well-intentioned agreement over a ‘responsibility to protect,’ if not
understood against its whole spectrum of unwarranted implications,
risks backfiring whenever a country’s failure does not (apparently)
fulfil the paper-based criteria required for intervention. When no
framework applies, States politically enjoy wider room for
manoeuvre, yet as soon as a legal framework is put in place, such a
room reduces significantly. With the R2P, “the U.N. projects itself
as the legitimate guardian of human beings on a global scale, albeit
280 Carolyn Helen Filteau, Rights and Responsibilities: What Are the Prospects for
the Responsibility to Protect in the International/Transnational Arena? 280 (Apr. 2015)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
Thesis
in
Law,
York
University
in
Toronto),
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/7 [https://perma.cc/6RJQ-CYAW].
281 David G. Lewis, The Myopic Foucauldian Gaze: Discourse, Knowledge and the
Authoritarian Peace, 11 J. INTERVENTION & STATEBUILDING 21, 26 (2017).
282 See KATE B. KLEIN, HUMANITARIANISM AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HUNGER 8
(2013).
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in extreme circumstances of [S]tate failure.” 283 Whilst theoretically
suitable for patent expressions of mass starvation and ‘quantitative’
hunger, the R2P framework as it is codified today thus seem illdesigned for addressing pervasive but ‘discrete’ manifestations of
‘qualitative’ hunger. Hidden hunger never manifests itself in
extreme forms, yet it extremely impairs the health, freedom, and
future of those who live under such conditions, as much as the
growth, development, and emancipation of their countries and
societies. As of today, not only have “[n]o major treaties [ . . . ]
made affirmative references to R2P,” 284 but pursuing simil-R2P
interventions, as if R2P was never codified, seems politically too
risky for any country to consider as an option. Someone empirically
demonstrated that R2P is anything but shelved, 285 yet besides its
potential reach, in practice it has never proven to be of any added
value in addressing hunger, even in the latter’s more ‘explicit’
manifestations. 286
In conclusion, millions of children, stuck in between the
previous lack of legal frameworks (as before the R2P) and the
ambiguities of—and unachieved consensus on—the existing quasilegal framework (the R2P itself), will continue to face a dark (if any)
future at the hand of a subtle, unapparent, and very much avoidable
condition named ‘hidden hunger.’ Was the necessitas non habet
legem-phase less defined by law and formalistically constrained,
and thus, paradoxically, more efficient in protecting them? More
time and empirical research are needed to seal a definitive answer. 287

283 Nicholas Tsagourias, Cosmopolitan Legitimacy and UN Collective Security, in
COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL
THEORY 129, 141 (Roland H. M. Pierik & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2010) (emphasis added).
284 Pandiaraj, supra note 152, at 813.
285 See generally Margaret ‘Maggie’ Powers, Responsibility to Protect: Dead, Dying,
or Thriving?, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1257–78 (2015) (analyzing how the R2P doctrine has
continued to be utilized by the United Nations despite the post-Libya backlash).
286 For the two examples of Myanmar and Zimbabwe, see CRISTINA GABRIELA
BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: SECURITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 141–45 (2011).
287 Furthermore, while this essay has adopted a typical Westphalian approach to PIL
doctrines, other emerging streams of literature conceptualise ‘food sovereignty’ as a
jurisdictional interlude which overlaps with, dilutes, or even blatantly opposes the statual
way of organising territory, assigning roles, apportioning responsibilities, and arranging
for citizens’ nutrition. See, e.g., Merisa S. Thompson, Alasdair Cochrane & Justa Mayra
Hopma, Democratising Food: The Case for a Deliberative Approach, 46 REV. INT’L STUD.
435, 439 (2020). See generally Daniele Conversi, Sovereignty in a Changing World: From
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Certainly though, the extemporaneous politics of humanitarianism
that was once free-riding and fluctuating upon particular interests
and rhetorical preferences, and that once “received no further
justification than the functionalist claim to be acting as executive
agent of the international community,” 288 has now been encoded
and subjected to further forms of international politics, but pseudolegalised—thus harder to overcome—ones. States are now obliged
to elaborate well-rounded justifications for intervening. For the time
being, (hidden) hunger seems to be the paradigmatic victim of this
“emergence of ‘political limits’ in a new global space organized by
a conception of sovereignty rooted in the principle of humanity”. 289

Westphalia to Food Sovereignty, 13 GLOBALIZATIONS 484 (2016);
288 Anne Orford, On International Legal Method, 1 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 166, 196
(2013).
289 Emily Kidd White, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty: Four Replies to Anne
Peters, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 545, 546 (2009).

